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   1	  
On	  the	  Significance	  of	  Humanity’s	  Collective	  Ownership	  of	  the	  Earth	  for	  
Immigration	  	  Mathias	  Risse,	  Harvard	  University	  January	  27,	  2014	  	  	  1.	  On	  Global	  Justice	  (OGJ)	  discusses	  immigration	  from	  the	  standpoint	  of	  humanity’s	  collective	  ownership	  of	   the	  earth.1	  	   I	   formulate	  an	  account	  of	  proportionate	  use	  of	  collectively	  owned	  resources	  and	  spaces	  and	  submit	  that	  a	  country	  that	  under-­‐uses	  its	   share	   ought	   to	   admit	  more	   immigrants.2	  One	   objection	   is	   that	   this	   approach	   is	  disconnected	   from	   what	   motivates	   migrants:	   people	   move	   to	   live	   in	   a	   safer	  environment	  and	   to	   join	   stronger	  economies,	  not	   to	  enjoy	  a	   share	  of	   resources	  or	  spaces.	  Since	  the	  structure	  of	  OGJ	  (whose	  first	  three	  parts	  more	  or	  less	  discuss	  one	  ground	   of	   justice	   at	   a	   time)	   subsumes	   immigration	   under	   an	   exploration	   of	  collective	  ownership,	  the	  objection	  that	  OGJ	  overstates	  the	  significance	  of	  collective	  ownership	  for	  immigration	  naturally	  arises.	  	  	   Indeed,	  my	  approach	  does	  not	   –	   and	  explicitly	   does	  not	   aim	   to	   -­‐-­‐	   track	   the	  motivation	   of	   would-­‐be	   immigrants.	   What	   motivates	   people	   and	   why	   they	   may	  proceed	  are	  different	  topics.	  Still,	  the	  relevance	  of	  collective	  ownership	  of	  the	  earth	  for	   immigration	   is	   worth	   revisiting.	   Considerations	   pertaining	   to	   the	   spatial	  distribution	   of	   people	   deserve	   more	   attention	   than	   mainstream	   thinking	   about	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Many	  thanks	  for	  Avery	  Kolers	  for	  very	  helpful	  comments,	  and	  to	  an	  audience	  at	  Sciences	  Po	  for	  good	  discussion	  when	  I	  presented	  this	  paper	  there	  in	  January	  2014.	  	  	  2	  Oberman	  (2011)	  points	  out	  there	  is	  a	  consensus	  in	  the	  literature	  that	  wealthy	  countries	  can	  choose	  between	  allowing	  people	  from	  poor	  countries	  to	  immigrate	  and	  to	  help	  them	  where	  they	  are.	  	  That	  choice	  view	  is	  indeed	  widespread,	  but	  my	  view	  is	  not	  part	  of	  that	  consensus.	  I	  argue	  that	  under-­‐using	  countries	  should	  permit	  immigration.	  I	  return	  to	  Oberman’s	  view	  below.	  The	  view	  of	  immigration	  in	  OGJ	  allows	  for	  the	  articulation	  of	  a	  fine-­‐grained	  answer	  to	  the	  challenge	  raised	  by	  Oberman’s	  proposed	  right	  to	  stay.	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immigration	  affords	   them.	   	   I	   am	  specifically	   interested	   in	   that	  part	   of	  mainstream	  thinking	  that	  explores	  why	  states	  may	  constrain	  immigration.3	  	  	   In	  a	  first	  step,	  section	  2	  reflects	  on	  how	  to	  integrate	  the	  topic	  of	  immigration	  into	   a	   theory	   of	   global	   justice,	   to	   assess	   what	   kind	   of	   role	   there	   could	   be	   for	  collective	   ownership	   of	   the	   earth.	   	   Sections	   3	   and	   4	   address	   recent	   arguments	   by	  Michael	   Blake,	   Christopher	  Wellman,	   David	   Miller	   and	   Ryan	   Pevnick.	   All	   of	   them	  argue	  that	  the	  state	  may	  keep	  out	  some	  or	  all	  would-­‐be	  immigrants,	  if	  necessary	  by	  force.	  All	   of	   them	   identify	   good	   reasons	   that	   entitle	   states	   to	   restrict	   immigration.	  But	   these	   approaches	   are	   incomplete	   as	   long	   as	   they	   neglect	   the	   distribution	   of	  people	   across	   the	   earth.	   Theorists	   who	   accept	   states	   and	   their	   right	   to	   exclusion	  should	  wonder	   about	   the	   costs	   imposed	   on	   others	   by	  maintaining	   such	   a	   system.	  Reflection	  on	  collective	  ownership	  fills	  that	  lacuna.4	  	   But	  my	  response	  to	  these	  authors	  generates	  an	  objection	  that	  cuts	  to	  the	  core	  of	  my	  approach.	  Suppose	  it	  is	  granted	  that	  we	  need	  a	  view	  of	  the	  fair	  distribution	  of	  people	  to	  articulate	  a	  globally	  acceptable	  stance	  on	  immigration.	  This	  does	  not	  imply	  that	  we	  should	  develop	  such	  an	  account	  in	  terms	  of	  proportionate	  use	  of	  resources	  and	   spaces.	   Other	   accounts	   are	   possible.	   First	   of	   all,	   one	   may	   argue	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  For	  most	  of	  the	  social	  science	  and	  legal	  literature	  on	  immigration	  the	  question	  of	  whether	  states	  are	  allowed	  to	  constrain	  immigration	  at	  all	  does	  not	  arise.	  Readers	  who	  approach	  the	  philosophical	  literature	  before	  this	  background	  may	  therefore	  be	  surprised	  about	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  the	  sheer	  acceptability	  of	  immigration	  constraints	  has	  become	  a	  philosophical	  problem.	  A	  symptomatic	  recent	  statement	  by	  a	  social	  scientist	  working	  on	  immigration	  is	  this:	  “Only	  from	  the	  wilder	  shores	  of	  libertarianism	  and	  utilitarianism	  can	  it	  be	  argued	  that	  immigration	  controls	  are	  ethically	  illegitimate”	  (Collier	  (2013),	  p	  246).	  Much	  of	  the	  philosophical	  interest	  in	  immigration	  has	  been	  fueled	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  that	  same	  view	  can	  also	  be	  supported	  from	  less	  “wild”	  shores.	  	  	  4	  Also	  to	  be	  considered	  here	  is	  Joseph	  Carens’	  new	  book	  on	  immigration,	  though	  I	  will	  not	  discuss	  him	  in	  any	  detail	  if	  he	  has	  nothing	  to	  add	  to	  his	  already	  published	  views	  (which	  is	  what	  I	  presume).	  	  	  
	   3	  
proportionate	   distribution	   should	   involve	   proportionality	   vis-­‐à-­‐vis	   overall	  wealth,	  including	  natural	   and	   societal	  wealth.	  The	   argument	   is	   that	   focusing	  on	   resources	  and	   spaces	   is	   unstable.	   Any	   new	   generation	   has	   done	   nothing	   to	   create	   natural	  resources.	   Nor	   have	   they	   created	   the	   societal	   wealth	   bequeathed	   to	   them.	   So	   all	  resources	  are	  relevantly	  alike	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  entitlements	  to	  shares	  of	  them.	  	  	   Yet	  another	  account	  agrees	  with	  mine	  that	  it	  is	  natural	  resources	  and	  spaces	  with	  regard	  to	  which	  the	  distribution	  of	  people	  across	  the	  earth	  should	  be	  assessed.	  But	   instead	   of	   proportionality	   another	   manner	   of	   assessing	   that	   distribution	   is	  employed.	  Kolers	  (2009)	  uses	  the	  term	  “ethnogeographic	  community”	  to	  emphasize	  that	   communities	   adopt	   land-­‐use	   patterns	   through	  which	   they	   control	   and	   shape	  space	  and	  which	  in	  turn	  shapes	  their	  culture.	  Their	  conception	  (“ontology”)	  of	  land	  materializes	   through	   acts	   of	   bounding,	   controlling	   and	   shaping	   space.	   This	   view	  permits	  a	  global	  standpoint,	  which	  would	  prescribe	  whose	  ontology	  of	  land	  matters	  in	  a	  region,	  and	  thereby	  determine	  fairness	  in	  the	  distribution	  of	  people.	  I	  defend	  my	  approach	   against	   both	   alternatives.	   I	   discuss	   the	  differences	   between	   societal	   and	  natural	  resources	  in	  sections	  6	  and	  7,	  and	  Kolers’s	  account	  in	  section	  8.	  Before	  we	  get	  there,	  section	  5	  responds	  to	  questions	  and	  objections	  raised	  by	  Malcolm	  Bull	  in	  a	  2013	  review	  of	  OGJ	  in	  the	  London	  Review	  of	  Books.	  Responding	  to	  his	  concerns	  will	  clarify	  important	  aspects	  of	  my	  approach.	  	  Section	  9	  concludes.	  	  	  2.	   Reflection	   on	   immigration	   is	   challenging	   partly	   because	   proposed	   changes	   in	  immigration	   policy	   are	   often	   plausible	   only	   if	   other	   policies	   also	   change.	   Suppose	  somebody	   advises	   against	   more	   immigration	   because	   the	   kind	   of	   immigration	   a	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country	  could	  expect	  would	  decrease	  wages	  of	  low-­‐income	  workers.	  This	  argument	  assumes	   that	   no	   additional	   social	   policy	   measures	   are	   available	   to	   aid	   these	  workers.	   	  Or	  one	  might	  argue	   that	  wealthier	   countries	  had	  better	  not	  admit	  more	  immigrants	  because	  their	   inhabitants	  already	  pollute	  too	  much.	  But	  that	  argument	  takes	   environmentally	   unacceptable	   behavior	   as	   given	   instead	   of	   insisting	   that	  wealthy	  countries	  must	  pay	  more	  heed	  to	  the	  environment	  anyway.	  	  It	  is	  impossible	  to	  think	  about	  the	  morality	  of	  immigration	  in	  isolation.	  	  If	  one	  reflects	   on	  what	   kind	   of	   immigration	   policy	   is	  morally	   required	   or	   permitted	   one	  must	   assess	  which	  other	  aspects	  of	  political	   and	  economic	   reality	   should	  or	   could	  also	   change.	   Generally,	   if	   philosophy	   is	   used	   to	  make	   practical	   recommendations,	  one	   can	   rarely	   make	   a	   proposal	   on	   only	   one	   subject.	   One	   has	   to	   make	   a	   set	   of	  interconnected	  proposals,	  and	  decide	  if	  implementation	  is	  possible.	  If	  the	  whole	  set	  cannot	   be	   implemented,	   one	   must	   see	   what	   guidance	   is	   available	   under	   the	  circumstances	  (which	  might	  be	  none).	  	  Political	  philosophy	  is	  not	  of	  great	  interest	  if	  it	   is	   constrained	   by	  what	   is	   politically	   possible	   in	   the	   short	   run.	   Still,	   for	   political	  thought	  to	  bear	  on	  reality	  it	  must	  be	  realistically	  utopian.	  It	  must	  be	  constrained	  by	  what	   is	   politically	   possible	   in	   the	   long	   run,	   or	   at	   least	   by	   what	   is	   economically,	  biologically	   or	   physically	   possible.	   It	   is	   crucial	   to	   be	   clear	   on	   how	   one	   sees	   one’s	  philosophical	  views	  constrained	  through	  such	  possibilities,	  and	  to	  be	  consistent	   in	  one’s	  choice	  of	  what	  kind	  of	  possibility	  constrains	  one’s	  theorizing.	  	  	  	   So	   it	  matters	   greatly	  whether	  we	   think	   about	   immigration	   in	   ideal	   or	   non-­‐ideal	  theory.	  	  We	  assess	  immigration	  under	  conditions	  of	  ideal	  theory	  if	  we	  assume	  that	  in	  all	  other	  regards	  the	  world	  is	  as	  it	  should	  be	  as	  far	  as	  justice	  is	  concerned.	  We	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do	  so	  under	  conditions	  of	  non-­‐ideal	  theory	  if	  we	  assume	  that	  in	  some	  other	  regards	  too	  the	  world	  is	  not	  as	  it	  should	  be.	  	  For	  some	  approaches	  to	  global	  justice	  questions	  about	   immigration	   arise	   only	  non-­‐ideally.	   Immigration	   can	  occur	   only	   if	   there	   are	  borders.	   If	   ideal	   theory	   abandons	   borders,	   no	   question	   about	   acceptable	  immigration	  arises.	  What	  such	  a	   theory	  entails	   for	  non-­‐ideal	  cases	  depends	  on	  the	  nature	   of	   the	   constraints	   that	   separate	   real-­‐life	   conditions	   from	   ideal	   theory.	   But	  here	  I	  am	  not	  interested	  in	  theories	  that	  hold	  that	  ideal	  theory	  excludes	  states	  but	  in	  theories	  that	  hold	  the	  opposite.	  Anybody	  who	  accepts	  that	  there	  are	  states	  in	  ideal	  theory	  owes	  a	  justification	  of	  states,	  one	  aspect	  of	  which	  is	  to	  show	  how	  particular	  principles	  of	  justice	  apply	  only	  within	  states.	  However,	  no	  such	  account	  by	  itself	  has	  strong	  implications	  for	  immigration.	  What	  one	  can	  show	  in	  this	  way	  for	  immigration	  is	  at	  most	  that	  immigration	  does	  not	  have	  to	  be	  entirely	  unconstrained.5	  Is	  it	  possible	  that	  in	  ideal	  theory	  no	  moral	  obligations	  regarding	  immigration	  apply	   (although	   states	   continue	   to	   exist)?	   This	   will	   be	   so	   if	   the	   theory	   regards	  immigration	  as	  purely	  remedial.	  Immigration	  will	  be	  remedial	  if	  it	  must	  be	  granted	  to	  people	  who	  do	  not	  find	  adequate	  living	  conditions	  where	  they	  live,	  or	  if	  it	  is	  seen	  as	   a	  way	  of	   aiding	  development	  by	  generating	   remittances.	  Remedial	   immigration	  does	  not	  occur	  in	  ideal	  theory.	  But	  immigration	  should	  not	  be	  viewed	  as	  exclusively	  remedial.	   Immigration	   policies	   problematically	   limit	   human	   freedom.	   One	   way	   of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  Below	  we	  discuss	  Blake’s	  (2013)	  account	  of	  why	  the	  state	  is	  entitled	  to	  constrain	  immigration.	  Blake	  (2001)	  is	  stage-­‐setting	  for	  the	  debate	  about	  whether	  anything	  about	  shared	  citizenship	  in	  a	  state	  makes	  particular	  principles	  of	  justice	  applicable	  only	  among	  citizens	  of	  a	  state.	  	  Blake	  answers	  affirmatively,	  pointing	  out	  that	  shared	  citizenship	  involved	  subjection	  to	  a	  coercively	  enforced	  regime	  of	  law.	  But	  he	  has	  made	  it	  clear	  that	  this	  answer	  says	  nothing	  about	  global	  obligations,	  in	  particular	  not	  about	  whether	  and	  to	  what	  extent	  the	  state	  can	  limit	  immigration.	  It	  is	  Blake	  (2013)	  that	  tells	  us	  how	  he	  thinks	  about	  the	  state’s	  obligations	  towards	  would-­‐be-­‐immigrants.	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capturing	  that	  thought	  is	  Martha	  Nussbaum’s	  version	  of	  the	  capability	  approach	  to	  human	   flourishing.	   She	   offers	   a	   list	   of	   capabilities	   central	   to	   dignified	   life.	   “Bodily	  integrity”	  appears	  there,	  and	  “being	  able	  to	  move	  freely	  from	  place	  to	  place”	  is	  one	  instantiation	   of	   bodily	   integrity	   ((2006),	   p	   76)).	   An	   account	   of	   global	   justice	   that	  regards	  immigration	  as	  purely	  remedial	  would	  miss	  this	  kind	  of	  moral	  significance	  of	  immigration.6	  One	  might	  say,	  alongside	  Miller	  (2005),	  that	  the	  right	  to	  free	  movement	  is	  not	  inexhaustible	  but	  best	  captured	  as	  a	  threshold.	  So	  a	  legitimate	  concern	  with	  freedom	  of	  movement	   is	   fully	  met	   if	   everybody	  has	   some	   space	   to	  move	   around.	   Concerns	  with	  bodily	  movement	  would	  not	  undermine	  the	  claim	  that	  a	  right	  to	  immigration	  is	  purely	  remedial.	  However,	  in	  section	  3	  I	  also	  turn	  to	  an	  example	  of	  severe	  underuse	  of	  resources	  under	  conditions	  of	  ideal	  theory.	  That	  kind	  of	  example,	  I	  believe,	  shows	  conclusively	  that	  we	  should	  not	  think	  of	  immigration	  as	  purely	  remedial.	  	  A	   theory	  of	  global	   justice	  should	  therefore	  address	   immigration	  under	  both	  ideal	   and	   non-­‐ideal	   conditions.	   What	   such	   a	   theory	   has	   to	   say	   under	   non-­‐ideal	  conditions	   depends	   on	   the	   nature	   of	   the	   deviation	   from	   ideal	   circumstances.	  Nothing	  much	  can	  be	  said	  about	  it	  at	  the	  abstract	  level.	  But	  without	  complications	  of	  that	  sort	  ideal	  theory	  can	  and	  must	  address	  immigration.	  OGJ	  does	  so	  by	  resorting	  to	  humanity’s	   collective	   ownership	   of	   the	   earth.	   	   Part	   1	   offers	   an	   account	   of	   the	  normative	   peculiarity	   of	   the	   state,	   the	   conditions	   that	   make	   it	   the	   case	   that	  particular	  principles	  of	   justice	  only	  hold	  among	  those	  who	  share	  membership	   in	  a	  state.	  The	  answer	  is	  that	  those	  who	  share	  such	  membership	  are	  subject	  to	  particular	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  For	  the	  significance	  of	  open	  borders	  for	  human	  freedom,	  see	  also	  Carens	  (2013),	  chapter	  11.	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forms	  of	  coercion	  and	  expected	  to	  participate	  in	  a	  certain	  form	  of	  cooperation.	  It	  is	  under	  those	  conditions	  that	  far-­‐reaching	  principles	  of	  justice	  govern	  the	  distribution	  of	  goods	  produced	  under	  those	  conditions.	  But	  since	  this	  kind	  of	  answer	  leaves	  open	  what	   an	   appropriate	   response	   to	   immigration	  demands	  would	   be,	   Part	   2	   turns	   to	  collective	  ownership	  to	  fill	  that	  lacuna.	  States	  may	  not	  exclude	  people	  from	  entering	  if	  they	  under-­‐use	  their	  share	  of	  resources	  and	  spaces.	  	  It	  would	  be	  implausible	  to	  leave	  it	  to	  the	  discretion	  of	  extraterritorial	  entities	  what	  kind	  of	  immigration	  a	  state	  should	  permit.	  Such	  a	  move	  would	  undermine	  any	  prospects	   of	   the	   state’s	   building	   an	   enduring	   collective	   spirit	   needed	   to	  maintain	  trust	  in	  everyday	  life.	  At	  least	  that	  is	  so	  if	  the	  number	  of	  immigrants	  is	  non-­‐trivial.7	  Once	  we	   grant	   that	   states	   exist	   in	   ideal	   theory	   the	   question	   is	   only	  whether	   they	  should	  have	  complete	  discretion	  in	  immigration,	  or	  whether	  immigration	  should	  be	  subject	  to	  moral	  constraints	  justifiable	  to	  both	  the	  people	  inside	  the	  country	  and	  to	  those	  outside.	  It	  is	  that	  second	  case	  that	  I	  develop	  in	  terms	  of	  collective	  ownership	  of	   the	   earth.	   We	   could	   then	   debate	   separately	   whether	   immigration	   should	   be	  administered	  from	  within	  the	  country	  or	  partly	  from	  outside.8	  	  So	  OGJ	  proposes	  a	  solution	  to	  the	  problem	  that	  an	  account	  of	  the	  normative	  peculiarity	   of	   states	   does	   not	   have	   a	   complete	   account	   of	   immigration	   “built	   in.”	  	  This	   approach	   integrates	   the	   concerns	  of	   those	  whom	   immigration	  policies	  would	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  Collier	  (2013)	  argues	  that	  moderate	  amounts	  of	  immigration	  are	  beneficial	  for	  host	  countries,	  but	  that	  a	  rapid	  influx	  of	  many	  immigrants	  may	  well	  undermine	  social	  trust.	  This	  will	  be	  so	  especially	  the	  more	  immigration	  increases	  diversity.	  For	  the	  link	  between	  diversity	  and	  trust,	  see	  Putnam	  (2007).	  	  	  8	  “Perhaps	  partly:”	  in	  cases	  of	  conflict	  in	  how	  to	  interpret	  policies	  the	  state	  should	  have	  a	  major	  say,	  for	  the	  same	  reason	  that	  excluded	  discretionary	  immigration	  policies	  decided	  by	  external	  entities.	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exclude.	  But	   this	   solution	   is	   in	  need	  of	   further	  elaboration.	   Specifically,	   it	  must	  be	  defended	   against	   other	   accounts	   of	   immigration	   that	   build	   on	   the	   normative	  peculiarity	   of	   the	   state,	   as	   well	   as	   against	   other	   views	   on	   how	   to	   think	   about	  proportionality	  in	  the	  distribution	  of	  human	  beings	  across	  the	  earth.9	  Immigrants	  are	  different	  from	  refugees.	  Refugees	  are	  people	  who,	  on	  account	  of	  political,	   legal	  social	  or	  economic	  circumstances	  at	  home,	  either	  permanently	  or	  temporarily	   cannot	  maintain	   a	  minimally	   decent	   life	   there	   and	   therefore	   relocate.	  Often	  relocation	  is	  an	  outright	  flight	  in	  the	  face	  of	  war	  or	  persecution.	  International	  law	   grants	   refugee	   status	   under	   such	   circumstances.	   But	   it	   might	   also	   be	   for	  economic	  reasons	   that	  people	  cannot	  make	  a	  decent	   living	  at	  home.	  This	  could	  be	  because	   of	   natural	   disasters,	   mismanagement	   or	   a	   callous	   political	   regime.	   As	  opposed	  to	  refugees,	  immigrants	  wish	  to	  relocate	  although	  their	  lives	  are	  not	  in	  as	  dire	   straits.	   There	   will	   be	   a	   continuum	   between	   clear	   cases	   of	   refuge	   and	  immigration.	  Our	  topic	  is	  immigration,	  but	  the	  line	  is	  hard	  to	  draw.	  However,	  what	  the	   cases	   have	   in	   common	   is	   that	   obligations	   towards	   refugees	   and	   obligations	  towards	  immigrants	  apply	  at	  the	  level	  of	  the	  global	  order	  as	  such.10	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9	  In	  light	  of	  the	  fact	  that,	  below,	  we	  discuss	  Blake	  (2013)	  it	  is	  worth	  recording	  that	  some	  earlier	  publications	  that	  offered	  that	  solution	  were	  joint	  with	  Blake	  –	  see	  Blake	  and	  Risse	  (2007)	  and	  (2009).	  	  	  	  10	  (1)	  OGJ	  offers	  a	  particular	  take	  on	  the	  situation	  of	  refugees.	  Human	  beings	  are	  co-­‐s	  of	  the	  earth.	  States	  are	  permitted	  to	  exclude	  others	  from	  their	  territory	  only	  if	  they	  (the	  states)	  are	  doing	  their	  share	  to	  make	  sure	  others	  can	  make	  a	  living	  where	  they	  reside.	  If	  people	  cannot	  make	  a	  living	  where	  they	  reside	  they	  cannot	  be	  prevented	  from	  exercising	  their	  liberty	  rights	  and	  move	  to	  different	  location.	  A	  case	  in	  point	  is	  the	  ongoing	  refugee	  crisis	  in	  in	  the	  Mediterranean,	  with	  many	  Africans	  trying	  to	  reach	  the	  EU	  by	  first	  crossing	  the	  desert	  to	  reach	  the	  shores	  and	  by	  then	  crossing	  the	  sea	  to	  the	  Italian	  island	  of	  Lampedusa.	  Many	  die	  in	  the	  process.	  Many	  of	  them	  apparently	  come	  from	  Eritrea,	  a	  country	  that	  imposes	  unlimited	  military	  service	  under	  harsh	  conditions	  on	  its	  citizens.	  First	  of	  all,	  qua	  human	  beings,	  these	  people	  have	  a	  claim	  to	  aid	  against	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  world.	  A	  duty	  of	  assistance	  in	  building	  institutions	  applies	  here	  (OGJ,	  chapter	  4).	  But	  this	  duty	  comes	  up	  against	  the	  limits	  of	  what	  is	  feasible	  to	  do	  about	  such	  situations	  from	  the	  outside.	  Secondly,	  these	  people	  are	  independently	  entitled	  to	  move	  to	  under-­‐using	  countries.	  Thirdly,	  if	  it	  is	  not	  feasible	  to	  offer	  aid	  in	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  3.	  Let	  us	  turn	  to	  other	  arguments	  that	  have	  recently	  been	  offered	  to	  show	  why	  states	  should	   be	   allowed	   to	   exercise	   control	   over	   immigration	   into	   their	   territory.	  	  Attempts	  to	  argue	  in	  support	  of	  the	  state’s	  right	  to	  exclude	  fail	  because	  they	  do	  not	  properly	   consider	   burdens	   imposed	   on	   those	   excluded	   by	   immigration	   policies.	  Some	  approaches	  do	  not	  consider	   the	  burdens	   imposed	  on	  outsiders	  at	  all.	  Others	  do	  not	  consider	  them	  convincingly.	  	  Let	   us	   start	  with	   Blake	   (2013).	   Blake	   uses	   two	   starting	   points.	   First	   of	   all,	  human	  beings	  not	  only	  have	  basic	  human	  rights,	  but	  also	  rights	  to	  the	  circumstances	  under	   which	   these	   rights	   are	   protected.	   Second,	   everybody	   has	   a	   right	   to	   avoid	  unwanted	  obligations	  where	   they	  have	  no	  duty	   to	  become	  obligated.	  Blake	  argues	  that	  what	  is	  crucial	  in	  the	  right	  to	  exclude	  is	  that	  the	  state	  is	  a	  territorial	  and	  legal	  community.	  The	  state’s	  territory	  marks	  out	  a	  jurisdiction	  within	  which	  its	  laws	  are	  effective.	   Somebody	   who	   migrates	   into	   a	   jurisdiction	   obligates	   its	   inhabitants	   to	  protect	  her	  basic	  human	  rights.	  But	  such	  an	  obligation	  constrains	  the	  freedom	  of	  the	  current	  inhabitants.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  building	  proper	  institutions,	  or	  if	  it	  simply	  does	  not	  happen	  under	  current	  political	  conditions,	  then	  those	  who	  leave	  the	  country,	  as	  co-­‐owners	  of	  the	  earth,	  have	  a	  claim	  against	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  world	  to	  be	  permitted	  to	  move.	  (2)	  Oberman	  (2011)	  argues	  for	  a	  “right	  to	  stay.”	  His	  opponents	  are	  those	  who	  argue	  that	  wealthy	  states	  have	  the	  choice	  between	  allowing	  for	  more	  immigration	  or	  helping	  the	  poor	  where	  they	  are.	  Oberman	  insists	  that	  there	  is	  no	  such	  choice:	  if	  the	  poor	  prefer	  to	  stay,	  they	  should	  be	  supported	  where	  they	  live.	  As	  I	  already	  pointed	  out,	  my	  view	  does	  not	  endorse	  such	  a	  choice	  at	  the	  level	  of	  ideal	  theory,	  but	  as	  my	  discussion	  of	  the	  Lampedusa	  scenario	  has	  made	  clear,	  such	  a	  choice	  may	  in	  fact	  arise	  in	  non-­‐ideal	  theory.	  Also,	  as	  we	  just	  saw,	  OGJ	  is	  consistent	  with	  a	  right	  to	  stay	  because	  I	  argue	  for	  a	  duty	  of	  assistance	  for	  poor	  countries	  (which	  is	  associated	  with	  common	  humanity	  as	  a	  ground	  of	  justice).	  So	  if	  they	  choose	  to	  stay	  rather	  than	  immigrate	  even	  though	  they	  would	  be	  permitted	  to	  enter	  elsewhere,	  they	  would	  still	  be	  the	  beneficiaries	  of	  that	  duty.	  A	  potential	  conflict	  could	  occur	  in	  cases	  of	  substantial	  over-­‐crowding	  that	  hampers	  development	  where	  nonetheless	  people	  refuse	  to	  leave	  the	  country	  to	  reach	  greener	  pastures	  elsewhere.	  But	  even	  in	  such	  a	  case	  a	  duty	  of	  assistance	  would	  apply	  though	  it	  would	  also	  be	  acceptable	  to	  reduce	  efforts	  to	  support	  the	  poor	  in	  such	  a	  case.	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The	  question	  becomes	  under	  what	  circumstances	  states	  may	  refuse	  to	  accept	  new	  obligations	   of	   the	   aforementioned	   sort.	   For	  Blake	   they	  may	  do	   so	   only	   if	   the	  country	   of	   origin	   adequately	   protects	   human	   rights.	   	   Otherwise,	  migrants	   acquire	  rights-­‐protections	  upon	  entry.	  Force	  used	  to	  prevent	  such	  individuals	  from	  entering	  is	  illegitimate.	  A	  state’s	  right	  to	  exclude	  people	  from	  poor	  and	  oppressive	  countries	  is	   generally	   weak.	   Blake	   compares	   his	   approach	   to	   Wellman	   (2008)	   who	   allows	  states	   to	   purchase	   the	   right	   to	   exclude	   by	   supporting	   development	   in	   poor	  countries.	  Blake	  insists	  that	  we	  cannot	  justify	  force	  against	  one	  person	  by	  providing	  benefits	  to	  others.	  Instead,	  the	  coerced	  party	  itself	  must	  be	  able	  to	  accept	  the	  use	  of	  force	  without	  having	  to	  identify	  with	  the	  interest	  of	  others	  to	  an	  undue	  extent.	  	   	  People	  are	  indeed	  entitled	  to	  an	  environment	  where	  they	  can	  exercise	  basic	  rights.	   Once	   they	   are	   admitted	   to	   a	   state,	   that	   state	   ought	   to	   make	   good	   on	   that	  entitlement.	  But	  I	  disagree	  with	  Blake	  about	  the	  conditions	  under	  which	  states	  may	  reject	  migrants.	  One	   thing	   to	  note	   is	   that	  his	  account	   falls	   silent	  once	  poverty	  and	  oppression	   are	   eradicated.	   Suppose	   we	   live	   under	   conditions	   of	   ideal	   theory:	   all	  duties	  of	  justice	  are	  met,	  domestically	  and	  internationally	  -­‐-­‐	  except	  that	  questions	  of	  immigration	  remain	  unsettled.	  Are	  people	  still	  entitled	  to	  move?	  People	  may	  enter	  if	  their	   right	   to	   appropriate	   conditions	   to	   realize	   their	   rights	   is	   not	  met	  where	   they	  live.	   Blake	   does	   not	   say	   they	   are	   entitled	   to	   enter	  only	   if	   that	   is	   the	   case.	   But	   the	  spirit	  of	  his	  discussion	  is	  such	  that	  immigration	  is	  remedial.	  Therefore	  his	  answer	  to	  the	  question	  posed	  must	  be	  negative.	  	  A	  purely	  remedial	  theory	  of	  immigration	  is	  problematic.	  Let	  us	  elaborate	  on	  that	   point	   in	   the	   context	   of	   Blake’s	   theory.	   Consider	   a	   scenario	   I	   have	   repeatedly	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used	   to	   motivate	   the	   importance	   of	   collective	   ownership	   of	   the	   earth	   for	  immigration.	  Suppose	   in	  the	   future	  a	  mysterious	  disease	  shrinks	  the	  population	  of	  the	   US	   to	   very	   few	   people	   but	   does	   not	   affect	   other	   parts	   of	   the	   world.	   With	  technological	   aids	   these	   survivors	   can	   exclude	  migrants.	   Suppose	   oppression	   and	  poverty	   have	   been	   eradicated	   so	   Blake	   would	   agree	   that	   nobody	   lives	   under	  circumstances	  that	  entitle	  her	  to	  move.	  He	  cannot	  find	  anything	  morally	  problematic	  about	   this	   situation	  where	   the	   few	  remaining	  Americans	   refuse	   to	  share.	   	  But	   this	  case	  shows	  that	  immigration	  is	  not	  purely	  remedial.	  It	  also	  makes	  clear	  that	  there	  is	  a	   distributional	   component	   to	   any	   plausible	   account	   of	   immigration.	   People	   may	  move	   into	   the	   depopulated	   US	   because	   the	   remaining	   Americans	   occupy	   a	  
disproportionate	  share	  of	  resources	  and	  spaces.11	  But	   if	   in	   ideal	   theory	   we	   should	   think	   about	   immigration	   in	   a	   way	   that	  includes	   a	   distributional	   component	   then	   non-­‐ideal	   theory	   will	   not	   entirely	   lack	  such	   a	   component.	   It	   would	   have	   to	   be	   brought	   to	   bear	   on	   immigration	   in	  conjunction	   with	   other	   constraints	   pertaining	   under	   given	   conditions.	   Some	  migrants	  desire	   to	  move	  to	  a	   location	  with	  special	   ties	   to	   their	  homeland	  and	  that	  therefore	   may	   have	   a	   special	   obligation	   to	   take	   them.	   Cases	   in	   point	   would	   be	  obligations	   of	   former	   colonial	   powers.	   But	  more	   commonly	   people	   determined	   to	  leave	  a	  poor	  or	  dysfunctional	  country	  simply	  wish	   to	   join	  any	  country	  with	  better	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  11	  One	  might	  worry	  that	  my	  reasoning	  in	  this	  paragraph	  is	  too	  quick.	  Perhaps	  the	  kind	  of	  example	  I	  have	  offered	  only	  shows	  that	  people	  have	  a	  right	  to	  move	  across	  the	  territory	  in	  question	  (here,	  the	  US),	  but	  not	  to	  settle	  there.	  	  My	  sense	  is	  that	  my	  example	  offers	  a	  case	  where	  people	  have	  a	  right	  to	  settle:	  within	  the	  range	  of	  normal	  human	  activities	  there	  is	  nothing	  the	  few	  remaining	  Americans	  could	  be	  doing	  with	  the	  territory	  that	  would	  create	  a	  reason	  to	  prevent	  would-­‐be	  immigrants	  from	  settling	  in	  the	  territory	  instead	  of	  just	  passing	  through.	  This	  is	  not	  to	  say	  a	  right	  to	  enter	  territory	  always	  has	  to	  be	  identical	  to	  a	  right	  to	  settle	  there.	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prospects.	   The	   destination	   country	   has	   no	   special	   duties	   towards	   such	  people.	   To	  the	  extent	  that	  there	  is	  a	  duty	  to	  provide	  such	  prospects,	  all	  countries	  that	  could	  do	  so	  have	   them,	  and	  must	  divide	   them	  up.	   	  This	  point	  applies	  regardless	  of	  whether	  the	  people	  in	  question	  are	  refugees	  or	  immigrants.	  	  Suppose	   some	   such	   people	   arrive	   in	   country	   C.	   On	   Blake’s	   account,	   C	   is	  obligated	   to	   create	   circumstances	   where	   they	   can	   realize	   their	   rights.	   C	   is	   not	  entitled	  to	  try	  to	  keep	  them	  away	  to	  avoid	  a	  situation	  where	  it	  becomes	  responsible	  in	   that	  way.	   But	   that	   seems	  wrong.	   C’s	   duty	   towards	   the	  migrants	   is	   no	   different	  from	  that	  of	  any	  country	  that	  can	  provide	  the	  circumstances	  under	  which	  migrants	  could	  realize	  their	  rights.	  C	  has	  an	  obligation	  to	  all	  people	  in	  this	  kind	  of	  situation.	  All	   such	   people	   have	   a	   claim	   against	   countries	   like	   C.	   C	   has	   obligations	   only	   as	   a	  member	   of	   the	   global	   order.	   The	   would-­‐be	   immigrants	   have	   claims	   against	   the	  global	  order,	  not	  specifically	  against	  C.12	  C	  is	  a	  duty-­‐bearer	  only	  as	  part	  of	  the	  global	  order.	  It	  should	  only	  shoulder	  an	  appropriate	  share	  of	  these	  responsibilities.	  	  If	   C	   refuses	   to	   accept	  more	   immigrants	   because	   it	   has	   already	   assumed	   its	  share	  of	  global	  responsibilities	  it	  does	  not	  ask	  would-­‐be	  immigrants	  to	  identify	  with	  the	   interests	  of	   others	   to	   an	  undue	  extent.	   It	  merely	   asks	   them	   to	  understand	   the	  nature	   of	   the	   relevant	   duties.	   Again,	   there	   may	   be	   cases	   where	   migrants	   have	   a	  special	  claim	  towards	  C.	  Moreover,	  what	  C	  can	  do	  with	  would-­‐be	   immigrants	  once	  they	  arrive	  is	  constrained	  by	  human	  rights	  considerations.	  But	  none	  of	  this	  detracts	  from	  the	  point	  that	  C	  generally	  only	  has	  obligations	  as	  part	  of	  an	  overall	  scheme	  that	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12	  Chapter	  11	  of	  OGJ	  explains	  what	  it	  means	  to	  have	  obligations	  to	  the	  global	  order.	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applies	   to	   the	   global	   order.	   So	   this	   again	   leads	   to	   distributional	   considerations.	  Countries	  must	  divide	  up	  would-­‐be	  immigrants.13	  	  Under	  current	  circumstances	  there	  is	  no	  global	  arrangement	  to	  regulate	  the	  distribution	   of	   would-­‐be	   immigrants	   (or	   for	   that	   matter,	   refugees).	   So	   what	   is	   a	  country	   supposed	   to	   do?	   This	   takes	   us	   to	   the	   debate	   about	   obligations	   under	  circumstances	  of	  incomplete	  compliance.	  There	  are	  two	  major	  views	  on	  this	  matter.	  One	  view	   (e.g.,	  Cullity	   (2004))	  holds	   that	  any	  given	  agent	   then	  has	   to	  do	  more,	   as	  much	  as	  she	  can,	   in	   fact.	  The	  competing	  view	  (e.g.,	  Murphy	  (2000))	  holds	  that	  she	  should	  do	  as	  much	  as	  she	  should	  otherwise,	  that	  is,	  if	  everybody	  did	  comply.	  My	   sympathies	   are	  with	   the	   latter	   view.	  But	   it	   also	  matters	  what,	   and	  how	  much,	   one	   would	   sacrifice	   if	   one	   did	   more	   than	   required	   under	   complete	  compliance,	  and	  how	  morally	  significant	  it	  would	  be	  if	  these	  supererogatory	  actions	  were	   performed.	   If	   one	   is	   called	   upon	   to	   do	   more	   than	   required	   under	   full	  compliance,	  one	  should	  make	  the	  more	  of	  that	  kind	  of	  effort	  the	  less	  of	  a	  sacrifice	  it	  would	   be	   to	   do	   so,	   and	   the	   more	   significant	   the	   matter	   is.	   	   So	   there	   is	   a	   strong	  obligation	   for	   wealthy	   countries	   to	   support	   refugees	   who	   seek	   to	   leave	   a	   war	   or	  drought	   zone	   even	   if	   others	   fail	   to	   do	   so	   and	   even	   if	   one	   has	   already	   done	   one’s	  share	   as	   it	   would	   be	   under	   ideal	   circumstances.	   For	   instance,	   during	   the	   Second	  World	  War,	  Switzerland	  had	  an	  obligation	  to	  accept	  more	  Jewish	  refugees	  from	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  13	  (1)	  A	  similar	  point	  can	  be	  made	  against	  Huemer	  (2010),	  who	  argues	  that	  immigration	  constraints	  are	  prima	  facie	  harmful	  and	  coercive	  in	  a	  way	  that	  cannot	  be	  outweighed	  by	  a	  range	  of	  standard	  considerations	  (negative	  effect	  on	  job	  markets,	  state’s	  obligation	  to	  its	  poorest,	  etc.)	  (2)	  Carens	  (2013)	  draws	  attention	  to	  certain	  difficulties	  that	  could	  arise	  if	  the	  country	  where	  claims	  to	  asylum	  or	  other	  claims	  to	  entry	  are	  accepted	  were	  different	  from	  the	  country	  where	  people	  then	  get	  to	  live.	  It	  may	  not	  always	  be	  a	  good	  idea	  literally	  to	  divide	  up	  immigrants	  or	  asylum	  seekers.	  But	  a	  country	  that	  would	  accept	  many	  new	  people	  should	  then	  get	  credit	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  other	  kinds	  of	  obligations.	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surrounding	  countries	  than	  it	  did.14	  If	  we	  are	  talking	  about	  immigrants	  who	  clearly	  do	   not	   count	   as	   refugees	   there	  would	   be	   no	   reason	   to	   do	   so.	   And	   then	   there	  will	  intermediate	  cases.	  	  	   	  4.	  When	  discussing	  Blake	  we	  have	  seen	  that	  a	  need	  for	  distributional	  considerations	  emerged	  from	  his	  own	  way	  of	  deriving	  obligations	  to	  would-­‐be	  immigrants.	  Let	  us	  turn	   to	   accounts	   that	   are	   less	   hospitable	   to	   such	   duties	   than	   Blake’s.	   One	   such	  account	   appears	   in	   Wellman	   (2008).	   	   Wellman	   advocates	   for	   a	   state’s	   right	   to	  restrict	   immigration	   in	   terms	  of	   freedom	  of	  association.	  On	  his	   view,	   a	   state	   is	   not	  even	  required	  to	  accept	  refugees.	  Wellman	  offers	  three	  arguments	  for	  this	  view.	  First	  of	  all,	  a	   right	   to	  self-­‐determination	  entitles	  countries	   to	  associate	  with	  others	   as	   they	   see	   fit.	   	   If	   one	   denies	   that	   legitimate	   states	   have	   such	   a	   right,	   one	  could	  not	  explain	  why	  they	  should	  not	  be	  forced	  into	  mergers.	  For	  instance,	  it	  would	  presumably	  be	  unacceptable	  for	  the	  US	  to	  annex	  Canada.	  Canadians	  have	  the	  right	  of	  freedom	  of	  association.	  But	  then	  they	  should	  be	  allowed	  to	  regulate	  immigration	  as	  they	  see	  fit.	  The	  second	  argument	  turns	  on	  the	  significance	  of	  freedom	  of	  association	  for	  people’s	   lives.	  People	  care	  deeply	  about	  their	  country.	  Therefore	  they	  also	  care	  about	  policies	  that	  shape	  how	  their	  countries	  evolve.	  Wellman	  considers	  freedom	  of	  association	   an	   integral	   part	   of	   self-­‐determination.	   As	   an	   individual’s	   freedom	   of	  association	  entitles	  one	  to	  remain	  single,	  a	  state’s	  freedom	  of	  association	  entitles	  it	  to	   exclude	   foreigners.	   The	   third	   argument	   turns	   on	   the	   weight	   of	   responsibility	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  14	  In	  August	  1942,	  Swiss	  politician	  Eduard	  von	  Steiger	  notoriously	  argued	  that	  Switzerland	  was	  like	  a	  small	  lifeboat	  that	  was	  already	  “stark	  besetzt,”	  well-­‐filled,	  and	  therefore	  should	  not	  be	  expected	  to	  accept	  more	  refugees	  (Schütt	  and	  Pollmann	  (1987),	  pp	  540f).	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entailed	   by	   shared	   membership	   in	   a	   state.	   There	   are	   special	   responsibilities	   of	  distributive	   justice	   among	   fellow	   citizens.	   That	   generates	   a	   reason	   to	   limit	   the	  number	  of	  people	  with	  whom	  one	  shares	  that	  relationship.	  Wellman	  recognizes	  the	  arbitrariness	  of	  one’s	  place	  of	  birth,	  but	  denies	  that	  this	  point	  outweighs	  concerns	  of	  self-­‐determination.	   Even	   help	   for	   refugees	   takes	   the	   disjunctive	   form	   of	   either	  sheltering	  them,	  or	  else	  of	  intervening	  to	  create	  a	  safe	  place	  where	  they	  originate.	  	  	   However,	  as	  soon	  as	  we	  have	  in	  sight	  ideas	  about	  fairly	  sharing	  the	  earth	  we	  also	   see	   the	   limitations	   of	   freedom	   of	   association	   as	   an	   idea	   that	   allows	   states	   to	  regulate	  immigration	  entirely	  as	  they	  please.	  People	  do	  not	  associate	  in	  virtual	  space	  or	  on	  an	   infinite	  plain,	  but	  by	  occupying	  parts	  of	  a	  planet	  with	   limited	  spaces	  and	  resources	   that	  must	   be	   shared.	  My	   example	   of	   the	   dwindled	   US	   population	   again	  makes	  the	  point.	  The	  remaining	  few	  do	  have	  freedom	  of	  association.	  However,	  their	  association	  must	  physically	  occur	  somewhere.	  But	  since	  for	  now	  humanity	  is	  limited	  to	  this	  planet,	  the	  amount	  of	  space	  that	  can	  be	  claimed	  by	  any	  group	  that	  insists	  on	  its	  right	  freely	  to	  associate	  is	   limited.	  Humanity’s	  collective	  ownership	  of	  the	  earth	  captures	  that	  thought.	  	  	   Notice	  how	  this	  engages	  Wellman’s	  arguments.	  We	  can	  ignore	  the	  third	  since	  it	   is	  much	   like	  Blake’s	  argument.	  And	   indeed,	   the	  US	  should	  refrain	   from	  annexing	  Canada.	   That	   is	   so,	   at	   least	   in	   part,	   because	   Canadians	   have	   the	   right	   to	   associate	  freely.	  But	  that	  does	  not	  imply	  Canadians	  may	  take	  up	  as	  much	  space	  as	  they	  wish	  to	  that	   end.	   Both	   claims	   are	   true:	   (a)	   the	   US	  may	   not	   annex	   Canada,	   partly	   because	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Canadians	   have	   freedom	   of	   association;	   (b)	   Canadians	   must	   adopt	   immigration	  policies	  to	  makes	  sure	  they	  exercise	  their	  freedom	  in	  an	  appropriate	  territory.15	   	  Miller	   (2005)	   compares	   immigration	   to	   marriage.	   There	   is	   a	   right	   to	  immigrate,	  says	  Miller,	  but	  it	  is	  like	  a	  right	  to	  marriage:	  one	  needs	  to	  find	  a	  willing	  partner.	  The	  UDHR	  reflects	  Miller’s	  position.	  Article	  13	  grants	  the	  right	  to	  leave,	  but	  not	   the	  right	   to	  enter	  a	  particular	  country,	  or	  even	   to	  enter	  somewhere.	  Article	  14	  merely	  grants	  a	  right	  to	  asylum.	  But	  the	  marriage	  analogy	  is	  misleading.	  	  Everybody	  is	  presumably	   free	   to	   enter	  marriage	  or	  not	  because	  what	  matters	   is	  whether	   the	  partners	   see	   this	   marriage	   as	   an	   appropriate	   match.	   Nothing	   about	   marriage	   is	  analogous	   to	   the	  spatial	  distributional	  component	   in	   immigration	  because	  nothing	  about	  marriage	  is	  analogous	  to	  natural	  ownership	  rights	  to	  the	  locations	  where	  the	  association	  would	  occur.	  	  	  One	   might	   ask	   what	   should	   happen	   if	   Canadians	   refuse	   to	   adopt	   an	  appropriate	  immigration	  policy.	  	  Would	  Americans	  then	  be	  allowed	  to	  annex	  Canada	  as	  a	  punitive	  measure,	  or	  at	  least	  a	  chunk	  of	  territory	  up	  to	  a	  point	  where	  Canadians	  do	  occupy	  a	  proportionately	  sized	  area?	  They	  would	  not,	  even	  if	  they	  themselves	  are	  in	   full	   compliance	   otherwise.	   A	   country	   does	   not	   forfeit	   its	   right	   to	   existence	   if	   it	  does	   not	   adopt	   a	   morally	   appropriate	   immigration	   policy.	   It	   should	   also	   be	  remembered	   that	   on	  my	   account	   considerations	   of	   proportionate	   distribution	   are	  considerations	   of	   reasonable	   acceptability.	   What	   can	   permissibly	   be	   done	   about	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  15	  For	  a	  very	  different	  use	  of	  freedom	  of	  association	  in	  the	  context	  of	  immigration,	  see	  Lister	  (2010).	  Lister	  uses	  that	  idea	  to	  argue	  that	  all	  states	  must	  allow	  a	  degree	  of	  family-­‐based	  immigration,	  and	  that	  this	  is	  a	  duty	  owed	  to	  its	  citizens.	  See	  White	  (1997)	  for	  general	  discussion	  of	  the	  connection	  between	  freedom	  of	  association	  and	  the	  right	  to	  exclude.	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violations	  of	  such	  matters	  is	  more	  limited	  than	  what	  can	  permissibly	  be	  done	  about	  violations	  of	  demands	  of	  justice.	  	  Things	   would	   be	   different	   if	   the	   US	   lost	   much	   of	   its	   territory	   to	   climate-­‐change	  related	  devastation,	  to	  the	  point	  that	  Americans	  could	  no	  longer	  meet	  basic	  needs	  but	  Canadians	  refuse	  to	  share	  their	  territory.	  In	  the	  2004	  blockbuster	  The	  Day	  
After	   Tomorrow	   climate	   change	   suddenly	   triggers	   a	   new	   ice	   age	   in	   the	   US.	   In	  response,	   massive	   evacuations	   (not	   to	   Canada	   but)	   to	   Mexico	   occur.	   In	   such	   a	  scenario	  there	  would	  be	  a	  duty	  of	  the	  neighboring	  country	  to	  host	  people,	  and	  then	  what	   counts	   as	   proportionate	   use	  would	   change	   substantially.	   	   At	   the	   same	   time,	  unless	  the	  evacuation	  affects	  largely	  unpopulated	  areas,	  the	  host’s	  jurisdiction	  must	  be	  accepted	  (assuming	  that	  state	  accepts	  its	  obligation	  to	  share	  its	  space).	  This	  is	  not	  an	  entirely	  academic	  point.	   In	  all	   likelihood,	  the	  US	  will	  not	   lose	  the	  habitability	  of	  much	  territory	  to	  climate	  change	  any	  time	  soon.	  But	  other	  countries	  will,	  especially	  small	   island	   states	   and	   low-­‐lying	   coastal	   countries.	   	   Such	   countries	   have	   similar	  entitlements.	  	  	   Wellman’s	  last	  argument	  is	  about	  the	  significance	  of	  self-­‐determination.	  It	  is	  proper	   that	  people	   care	  about	  how	   their	   country	  evolves,	  but	   this	   evolution	  again	  occurs	   in	  shared	  space.	  Within	   limits	  people	  may	  choose	   immigrants.	  So	   the	  sheer	  fact	   that	   the	   evolution	   of	   a	   country	   occurs	   in	   shared	   space	  does	  not	  mean	  people	  entirely	  lose	  control	  over	  the	  policies	  that	  shape	  their	  country.	  	  	   What	  about	  the	  point	   that	  aid	  can	  be	  provided	   in	  different	  ways?	  For	  many	  obligations	   it	   will	   not	   matter	   how	   the	   duty	   bearers	   make	   good	   on	   them.	   This	   is	  especially	   so	   if	   we	   are	   talking	   about	   remedial	   duties.	   After	   all,	   the	   point	   of	   such	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duties	  is	  to	  provide	  relief	  from	  hardship.	  Perhaps	  a	  monetary	  transfer	  brings	  relief.	  Perhaps	  relocation	  does.	  But	  again,	  immigration	  is	  not	  merely	  about	  aid.	  There	  is	  an	  irreducibly	  spatial	  and	  distributional	  aspect	  to	  immigration.	  	  	   This	   discussion	   of	   Blake	   and	   Wellman	   makes	   the	   basic	   point	   about	   the	  importance	   of	   the	   distributional	   component	   of	   immigration.	   Let	  me	  briefly	   sketch	  how	  the	  same	  point	  arises	  for	  other	  authors.	  Miller	  (2005)	  presents	  two	  reasons	  for	  limiting	   immigration.	  First,	  he	   insists	  on	  the	   importance	  of	  a	  shared	  public	  culture	  that	   partly	   constitutes	   political	   identity	   in	   a	   society,	   something	   people	   have	   an	  interest	  in	  controlling	  as	  it	  changes.	  Moreover,	  and	  this	  is	  similar	  to	  Wellman,	  Miller	  thinks	   the	   population	   is	   rightly	   concerned	   with	   size	   because	   worries	   about	   the	  quality	  of	   life	  and	  the	  environment	  relate	  to	  population	  density.	  Miller’s	  points	  are	  valid,	  but	  in	  light	  of	  the	  need	  to	  share	  this	  planet	  they	  cannot	  be	  used	  to	  infer	  that	  the	  state	  may	  limit	  immigration	  as	  it	  sees	  it.	  	  Finally,	   Pevnick	   (2011)	   argues	   that	   those	   who	   have	   in	   the	   past	   created	   a	  political	   community	   have	   property	   rights	   over	   the	   institutions	   that	  maintain	   that	  community.	   It	   is	   for	   this	   reason	   that	   they	   can	   exclude	   outsiders.	   Pevenick	   thinks	  these	  rights	  sometimes	  get	  overruled.	  What	  he	  has	  in	  mind	  is	  again	  a	  remedial	  use	  of	  immigration.	  In	  what	  now	  is	  a	  familiar	  pattern,	  Pevnick	  too	  ignores	  that	  ownership	  of	  institutions	  is	  superimposed	  on	  collective	  ownership	  of	  the	  spaces	  and	  resources	  on	  which	  these	  institutions	  are	  erected.	  	  	  	  5.	  	  Next	  I	  address	  some	  objections	  raised	  by	  Malcolm	  Bull	  (2013)	  in	  his	  review	  in	  the	  
London	  Review	  of	  Books.	  Bull	  thinks	  my	  account	  of	  proportionality	  is	  “half-­‐baked:"	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What	  sort	  of	  average	  are	  we	  talking	  about,	  given	  that	  any	  simple	  average	  will	  be	  skewed	  by	  densely	  populated	  small	  island	  states?	  Why	  should	  the	  average	  be	  more	  significant	  than	  the	  relative	  use-­‐rate	  between	  countries?	  And	  what	  if	  there	  were	  eventually	  only	  one	  country	  above	  the	  average?	  Would	  there	  then	  be	   only	   one	   legitimate	   destination	   for	   all	   the	   world’s	   immigrants,	   even	   if,	  blighted	   by	   the	   resource	   curse	   (the	   paradoxical	   underdevelopment	   of	  countries	   with	   abundant	   natural	   resources),	   that	   country	   were	   one	   of	   the	  world’s	   poorest	   nations?	   However	   you	   calculate	   it,	   per	   capita	   use-­‐rate	   is	  going	  to	  be	  very	  low	  not	  just	  in	  North	  America,	  but	  also	  in	  places	  like	  Russia,	  Saudi	   Arabia,	   Venezuela	   and	   the	   Congo,	   and	   very	   high	   in	   small	   wealthy	  countries	   like	   Singapore,	   the	  Netherlands	   and,	   arguably,	   the	   UK.	   Currently,	  net	  migration	  to	  many	  of	  the	  countries	  in	  the	  former	  category	  is	  almost	  zero,	  while	  immigrants	  pour	  into	  the	  latter.	  Migrants	  today	  aren’t	  usually	  looking	  to	  stake	  out	  a	  fertile	  parcel	  of	  land.	  Most	  are	  seeking	  to	  share	  the	  benefits	  of	  recent	   technological	   and	   cultural	   innovations	   made	   in	   other	   countries	   –	  resources	   specifically	   excluded	   from	   Risse’s	   calculations.	   So	   although	   his	  proposal	  might	   challenge	   current	   immigration	  policies	   in	  North	  America,	   it	  would	   also	   permit	   more	   restrictive	   ones	   in	   many	   of	   the	   world’s	   other	  advanced	  economies,	  and	  eventually	  channel	  migrants	  towards	  the	  wastes	  of	  Siberia	   and	   the	   jungles	   of	   the	   Congo.	   Even	   then,	   immigrants	   would	   not	  necessarily	  be	  able	  to	  enter	  the	  country;	  it	  is	  merely	  ‘a	  demand	  of	  reasonable	  conduct’	  that	  the	  host	  country	  let	  them	  in.	  ＊This	  would	  still	  be	  the	  case	  if,	  for	  example,	   the	   population	   of	   the	   US	   shrank	   to	   two	   people	   able	   to	   maintain	  border	  controls	  with	  electronic	  equipment.	  According	  to	  Risse,	  who	  returns	  repeatedly	   to	   this	   scenario,	   would-­‐be	   immigrants	   would	   not	   be	   doing	  anything	   unjust	   if	   they	   tried	   to	   dismantle	   the	   surveillance	   to	   enter	   the	  country,	  but	  neither	  would	  the	  two	  Americans	  if	  they	  redoubled	  their	  efforts	  to	  keep	  the	  immigrants	  out.	  So,	  if	  there	  were	  a	  famine	  in	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  world,	  and	  everyone	  sought	  entry	  to	  the	  United	  States,	  the	  two	  Americans	  would	  be	  entitled	   to	   use	   their	   robotic	   guards	   to	   detain	   the	   rest	   of	   the	   world’s	  population	   at	   the	   border	   and	   feed	   them	   their	   ration	   of	   natural	   resources	  there	   –	   an	   arrangement	   not	   unlike	   the	   one	   currently	   enjoyed	   by	   the	  inhabitants	  of	  the	  Gaza	  Strip.	  It	  would	  be	  unreasonable,	  but	  it	  would	  not	  be	  unjust.	  	  I	  quote	  Bull	  at	  length	  because	  he	  raises	  questions	  that	  deserve	  answers.16	  Let	  me	   respond	   to	   them	  one	   by	   one.	   Bull	   asserts	   that	   densely	   populated	   small	   island	  states	   “skew”	   the	   average	   per-­‐capita	   use	   rate	   of	   resources	   and	   spaces.	   Let	   us	   see	  what	   that	   would	   mean.	   That	   description	   arguably	   fits	   Bahrain,	   Singapore,	   Malta,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  16	  Bull	  mischaracterized	  my	  account	  in	  other	  ways	  that	  I	  have	  addressed	  in	  a	  letter	  to	  the	  editor	  that	  appeared	  in	  Vol.	  35,	  No	  7,	  11	  April	  2013.	  But	  his	  account	  of	  my	  immigration	  proposal	  is	  accurate.	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Barbados,	  Taiwan,	  Mauritius,	  the	  Maldives,	  Tuvalu	  and	  Nauru.	  Suppose	  each	  of	  these	  is	   absorbed	   by	   a	   bigger	   country	  with	   higher	   per-­‐capita	   use-­‐rate.	   (Each	   person	   in	  those	  bigger	  countries	  has	  on	  average	  more	  resources	  and	  spaces	  at	  her	  disposal.)	  Suppose	  afterwards	  the	  per-­‐capita	  use	  rate	  of	   the	  absorbing	  country	   is	   lower	  than	  before	   but	   higher	   than	   the	   earlier	   average	   across	   that	   country	   (prior	   to	   the	  absorption)	  and	  the	  absorbed	  country.	  	  As	  a	  result,	  the	  average	  per	  capita	  use	  rate	  across	  all	  countries	  increases:	  the	  average	   person	   in	   the	   average	   country	   now	   has	   a	   higher	   share	   of	   resources	   and	  spaces	   at	   her	  disposal.	   The	   existence	  of	   a	   densely	  populated	   small	   country	  where	  the	   average	   person	   has	   a	   small	   share	   of	   resources	   and	   spaces	   at	   her	   proposal	  slightly	  decreases	  the	  world	  average	  across	  countries.	  So	  if	  densely	  populated	  small	  island	   states	   disappear,	   the	   benchmark	   average	   value	   with	   regard	   to	   which	  permissibility	  of	  immigration	  is	  assessed	  rises.	  Among	  other	  things,	  this	  means	  it	  is	  harder	  to	  qualify	  as	  an	  under-­‐using	  country	  and	  that	  under-­‐using	  countries	  have	  to	  permit	  less	  immigration	  than	  in	  the	  status	  quo.	  Suppose	   the	   number	   of	   densely	   populated	   island	   states	   increases	   instead.	  Suppose	  Santa	  Cruz	  del	  Islote	  declared	  its	  independence	  from	  Colombia,	  Hong	  Kong	  island	   from	   China,	   and	  Migingo	   island	   in	   Lake	   Victoria	   from	  Kenya.	   Suppose	   also	  Malé	   seceded	   from	   the	   rest	   of	   the	  Maldives	   and	  Ebeye	   from	   the	  Marshall	   Islands.	  These	  are	   some	  of	   the	  most	  densely	  populated	   islands.	   	  We	  would	   see	  new	  states	  with	  high	  over-­‐use	  of	  resources	  and	  spaces,	  much	  above	  world	  average.	  The	  average	  person	   in	   the	   average	   country	   has	   less	   at	   her	   disposal.	   	   It	   would	   be	   easier	   for	   a	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country	   to	   be	   classified	   as	   under-­‐using.	   Meeting	   immigration	   demands	   would	   be	  harder.	  	  Under-­‐users	  must	  permit	  more	  immigration	  to	  reach	  proportionality.	  	  	   In	   a	   nutshell,	   the	   nature	   of	   the	   “skewing”	   is	   that	   the	   existence	   of	   densely	  populated	  small	  island	  countries	  decreases	  the	  global	  use	  average	  across	  countries.	  Thus	   the	   existence	   of	   such	   countries	   increases	   the	   demand	   for	   immigration	  elsewhere	  compared	  to	  a	  situation	  without	  such	  states.	  	  Why	  would	   this	   be	   problematic?	   One	   possibility	   is	   that	   small	   island	   states	  attract	  populations	  and	  generate	  economic	  success	  out	  of	  proportion	  to	  their	  size.	  It	  would	  be	  unfair	  if	  their	  existence	  drove	  up	  demand	  for	  immigration	  elsewhere	  since	  immigrants	   are	   not	   after	   shares	   of	   resources	   and	   spaces.	   But	   small	   island	   states	  would	  probably	  not	  be	   as	   intuitively	   troublesome	  as	  Bull	  may	   think.	  The	   relevant	  measure	   is	   not	   population	   density	   but	   the	   value	   for	   human	   purposes	   of	   three-­‐dimensional	  regions.	  Being	  an	  island	  is	  disadvantageous	  if	  it	  is	  a	  remote	  place	  in	  the	  path	   of	   storms	   and	   shunned	   by	   fish.	   But	   being	   an	   island	   is	   often	   distinctly	  advantageous	  for	  proximity	  to	  fisheries	  or	  seabed	  resources,	  opportunities	  to	  groom	  tourism,	   proximity	   and	   access	   to	   shipping	   routes,	   and	   because	   of	   the	   fondness	  people	  have	  for	  living	  by	  the	  water.	  	  Often	  the	  fact	  that	  an	  area	  is	  an	  island	  increases	  its	   value	   for	   human	   purposes,	   other	   things	   equal.	   Such	   islands	   do	   not	   drive	   up	  immigration	  pressure	  elsewhere.	  	  	   I	  am	  not	  sure	  what	  else	  could	  be	  problematic	  about	  small	  island	  states,	  but	  if	  it	  is	  that	  sort	  of	  thing,	  we	  must	  postpone	  a	  verdict	  on	  the	  seriousness	  of	  the	  problem	  (if	   any)	   until	   a	   relatively	   concrete	   way	   of	   assessing	   proportionate	   use	   becomes	  available.	   If	   ultimately	   small	   island	   states	   do	   trigger	   counterintuitive	   results,	   one	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might	  either	  remove	  them	  from	  the	  calculations	  to	  increase	  the	  overall	  plausibility	  of	  the	  results,	  or	  decide	  not	  to	  worry	  too	  much	  about	  such	  distortions.	  After	  all,	   in	  light	  of	  the	  general	  difficulties	  in	  seeing	  through	  secessions	  it	  is	  unlikely	  that	  we	  will	  see	   a	   significant	   increase	   in	   the	   number	   of	   small	   island	   states	   in	   the	   foreseeable	  future.	  Climate	  change	  pushes	  for	  the	  opposite	  tendency.	  	  	  	   But	  why,	  to	  return	  to	  Bull,	  should	  averages	  be	  more	  significant	  than	  relative	  use-­‐rates	  between	  countries?	  	  I	  take	  it	  the	  competing	  proposal	  Bull	  refers	  to	  under	  “relative	  use-­‐rate”	  is	  this.	  Suppose	  country	  A	  has	  a	  lower	  per-­‐capita	  use	  rate	  than	  B.	  So	   since	   on	   average	   people	   in	   A	   have	   less	   access	   to	   resources	   and	   spaces,	   they	  should	  be	  allowed	  to	  move	  to	  B.	  	  However,	  there	  is	  nothing	  morally	  relevant	  about	  this	   bilateral	   comparison.	   The	   natural	   space	  where	   humans	   reside	   for	   now	   is	   the	  earth.	   That	   is	   the	   space	   through	   which	   we	   can	   readily	   disseminate	   with	   our	  technology.	  People	  in	  A	  have	  a	  grievance	  only	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  their	  share	  of	  the	  whole.	  This	  is	  my	  point	  against	  Blake.	  Aside	   from	  special	   ties	  between	  regions,	  we	  must	   think	  about	  immigration	  in	  terms	  of	  movement	  across	  the	  planet,	  rather	  than	  bilaterally.	  	  If	   eventually	   there	   were	   only	   one	   country	   above	   the	   average	   (and	   thus	  under-­‐using),	   to	   continue	   with	   Bull,	   that	   would	   be	   the	   only	   destination	   to	   which	  immigrants	  have	  a	  claim.	  If	  that	  country	  were	  governed	  badly,	  it	  might	  be	  unwise	  to	  relocate	  there.	  But	  that	  country	  could	  not	  reject	  people	  because	  it	  is	  “full.”	  	  Perhaps	  it	  would	  be	  unfair	  to	  residents	  if	  more	  people	  were	  to	  immigrate	  if	   it	   is	  because	  of	  governmental	   failures	   that	   things	   are	   bad.	   Suppose	   a	   group	   that	   takes	   care	   of	   its	  own	  security	  migrates	  to	  a	  badly	  governed	  country	  to	  exploit	  resources,	  or	  to	  find	  a	  new	   place	   to	   live.	   They	   might	   make	   arrangements	   with	   the	   government,	   but	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ultimately	  this	  change	  can	  be	  expected	  to	  harm	  the	  locals.	  However,	  there	  are	  duties	  of	  justice	  that	  may	  trump	  considerations	  of	  reasonable	  acceptability	  of	  the	  sort	  that	  would	  permit	  more	  immigration.	  If	  immigration	  undermines	  a	  duty	  of	  assistance	  in	  institution-­‐building,	  it	  should	  be	  suspended.	  	  Or	  perhaps	  what	  Bull	  has	  in	  mind	  is	  that	  scoring	  high	  on	  the	  scale	  of	  value	  for	  human	  purposes	  is	  inherently	  connected	  to	  bad	  governance.	  But	  we	  have	  no	  reason	  to	  think	  so.	  Much	  more	  would	  enter	  into	  the	  calculations	  to	  assess	  that	  kind	  of	  value	  than	  resources.	  Any	  connotations	  with	  the	  resource	  curse	  would	  be	  misguided	  given	  our	  current	  state	  of	  knowledge.	  	  Bull	   is	   right	   that	   migrants	   nowadays	   usually	   seek	   to	   share	   the	   benefits	   of	  recent	  technological	  or	  cultural	  innovations,	  human-­‐made	  resources	  I	  exclude	  from	  what	  should	  be	  commonly	  shared.	  It	  is	  correct	  that	  my	  proposal	  would	  likely	  change	  immigration	  policies	   in	  North	  America	  (and	  Australia)	  but	  permit	  more	  restrictive	  ones	   in	   Europe.	   	   But	   that	   seems	   fair.	   For	   demographic	   and	   thus	   self-­‐interested	  reasons,	   Europe	   should	   encourage	   immigration,	   but	   at	   an	   appropriate	   speed	   to	  avoid	   complex	   and	   prolonged	   social	   problems	   intense	   immigration	   into	   densely	  populated	   countries	   could	   entail	   (Collier	   (2013),	   chapter	   5).	   Still,	   it	   is	   a	   sensible	  guess	  that	  any	  plausible	  measure	  of	  proportionate	  use	  would	  find	  Europe	  much	  less	  wanting	  than	  the	  US	  or	  Australia.	  But	  perhaps	  Bull’s	  concern	  is	  that	  societal	  wealth	  also	  generates	  claims	  to	  shared	  ownership.	  That	  point	  I	  discuss	  below.	  	  	   Finally,	   Bull	   worries	   that	   immigrants	   may	   not	   be	   able	   to	   enter	   since	   it	   is	  merely	   a	   demand	   of	   reasonable	   conduct	   that	   hosts	   let	   them	   in.	   Indeed,	   in	   my	  dwindled-­‐population	   example,	  would-­‐be	   immigrants	  would	  not	   be	   doing	   anything	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unjust	  by	  dismantling	  surveillance	  systems	   that	  keep	   them	  out,	  but	  neither	  would	  the	  remaining	  Americans	  by	  redoubling	  efforts	  to	  keep	  them	  out.	  	  Bull	  is	  right	  that	  if	  there	  were	  famines	  in	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  world,	  and	  everyone	  sought	  entry	  to	  the	  US,	  the	  Americans	  would	   be	   entitled	   to	   use	   robotic	   guards	   to	   detain	   the	   others	   and	   feed	  them	  their	  ration	  of	  resources	  at	  the	  border.	  	   This	   would	   not	   be	   unjust	   but	   highly	   unreasonable.	   One	   may	   wonder	   how	  much	  bite	  it	  has	  to	  say	  that.	  Chapter	  17	  of	  OGJ	  discusses	  how	  different	  principles	  of	  justice	   apply	   to	   the	   state.	   Principles	   that	   capture	   reasonable	   expectations	   should	  only	   be	   integrated	   at	   a	   later	   stage	   of	   development	   than	   principles	   of	   justice	  concerned	  with	  non-­‐domestic	  matters,	  at	  a	  stage	  when	  countries	  can	  be	  expected	  to	  contribute	   to	   the	   creation	   of	   a	  mutually	   acceptable	   global	   order.	   But	   once	   such	   a	  stage	   is	   reached,	   reasonable	   conduct	   concerned	   with	   immigration,	   among	   other	  things,	   should	   get	   priority	   over	   principles	   of	   justice	   concerned	   with	   the	   relative	  standing	  of	  citizens	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  each	  other.	  	  	   Bull	  may	   not	   think	   this	   is	   enough.	   But	   even	   if	   something	  were	   a	  matter	   of	  justice	   there	   is	   a	   guarantee	   that	   it	   be	   done	   only	   to	   the	   extent	   that	   those	  who	   can	  make	   it	   happen	   prioritize	   the	   relevant	   measures	   in	   their	   actions.	   Justice,	   in	   that	  regard,	  is	  no	  different	  from	  reasonable	  conduct.	  Human	  beings	  must	  bring	  it	  about.	  	  	  6.	   Anybody	   who	   thinks	   my	   proposal	   can	   be	   defended	   this	   far	   may	   still	   be	  unconvinced.	  Distribution	  in	  terms	  of	  proportionality	  is	  all	  well	  and	  good,	  objectors	  may	  say,	  but	  the	  resources	  with	  regard	  to	  which	  to	  do	  the	  calculations	  must	  include	  human	   creations.	  The	  point	   is	  not	   even	  primarily	   that	   immigration	   tracks	   societal	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wealth	  rather	  than	  natural	  resources	  and	  spaces.	  The	  motivation	  is	  that	  for	  any	  new	  generation,	   natural	   and	   societal	   resources	   are	   fundamentally	   alike:	   they	   have	   not	  done	  anything	  to	  create	  either	  sort.	  For	  them,	  all	  resources	  are	  manna	  from	  heaven.	  	  	   Suppose	  humanity	  must	  evacuate	  the	  earth	  and	  eventually	  reaches	  a	  planet	  occupied	   by	   an	   advanced	   civilization.	   The	   indigenous	   population	   recently	   went	  extinct	  on	  account	  of	  an	  infection	  from	  which	  earth	  organisms	  are	  immune.	  Human	  understanding	   is	   advanced	  enough	   to	   comprehend	  how	   to	  use	   the	   technology	   left	  behind	  by	  these	  beings.	  Those	  societal	  resources	  are	  a	  windfall.	  As	  they	  think	  about	  distribution,	  the	  new	  arrivals	  should	  treat	  natural	  and	  societal	  resources	  alike.	  But	  every	   new	   generation	   on	   earth	   is	   like	   them.	   They	   find	   both	   natural	   and	   societal	  resources	  that	  from	  their	  standpoint	  simply	  exist	  without	  being	  the	  accomplishment	  of	  anybody	  in	  that	  generation.	  Or	  so	  the	  objector	  may	  elaborate.	  	   One	  response	  is	  to	  return	  to	  the	  three	  starting	  points	  for	  my	  development	  of	  humanity’s	  collective	  ownership	  of	   the	  earth	  (OGJ,	  chapter	  6):	  satisfaction	  of	  basic	  human	   needs	   matters;	   resources	   and	   spaces	   of	   the	   earth	   are	   needed	   by	   all	   for	  survival	   and	   for	  all	  human	  activities	   to	  unfold;	   resources	  and	  spaces	  are	  nobody’s	  accomplishment.	   Based	   on	   those	   starting	   points	   I	   have	   argued	   for	   Common	  Ownership	  as	  the	  most	  sensible	  conception	  of	  collective	  ownership,	  drawing	  on	  its	  minimalist	  credentials	  and	  the	  weaknesses	  of	  competing	  conceptions.	  	  	  Societal	   resources	  on	  earth	  differ	   from	  natural	   resources	   in	   three	  ways.	  To	  begin	  with,	  they	  are	  somebody’s	  accomplishment.	  Secondly,	  they	  were	  generated	  in	  social	   contexts	   that	   enabled	   their	   creation	   by	   permitting	   the	   accumulation	   of	  knowledge	  and	  the	  emergence	  and	  nurturing	  of	  skills.	   	  These	  contexts	  disappear	  if	  
	   26	  
societies	  collapse	  and	  vanish.	  But	  even	  when	  societies	  are	  conquered	  or	  otherwise	  absorbed	  there	  often	  remains	  much	  continuity.	  Contexts	  that	  enable	  the	  creation	  of	  artifacts	   involve	   living	   people	   differentially.	   Some	   are	   involved	   in	   maintaining	   a	  culture	  that	  permits	  for	  the	  relevant	  kind	  of	  production.	  Others	  are	  not.	  	  Thirdly,	   the	   sense	   in	   which	   natural	   resources	   and	   spaces	   are	   needed	   also	  differs	  importantly	  from	  how	  societal	  resources	  are	  needed.	  Any	  newborn	  baby	  will	  perish	  without	  access	  to	  resources	  and	  spaces,	  but	  also	   if	   it	  does	  not	  receive	  basic	  care	  and	  thus	  becomes	  a	  beneficiary	  of	  societal	  resources	  (if	  only	  by	  availing	  itself	  of	  parental	   care).	  But	   for	  natural	   resources	  we	   can,	   and	  must,	  naturally	  describe	   the	  sense	   in	  which	   they	  are	  needed	  as	   including	   the	  earth	   system	  as	  a	  whole.	   	  At	   this	  stage	  of	  geological	  history,	   the	  earth	   is	  hospitable	   to	  human	   life.	  Some	  regions	  are	  more	   hospitable	   than	   others.	   But	   even	   for	   those	   parts	   that	   create	   the	   conditions	  under	   which	   human	   life	   flourishes	   it	   would	   be	   inappropriate	   not	   to	   think	   of	   the	  favorable	  conditions	  as	  part	  of	  an	  earth	  system.	  The	  earth	  as	  a	  whole	  is	  the	  natural	  habitat	  for	  human	  beings	  as	  a	  species.	  Thus	  it	  is	  the	  habitable	  conditions	  of	  the	  earth	  as	  such	  that	  we	  need	  for	  survival,	  much	  as	  our	  species	  has	  needed	  them	  to	  rise	  at	  all.	  	  That	  is	  very	  different	  for	  societal	  resources.	  Families,	  tribes,	  nations	  or	  other	  cultural	  niches	  provide	  the	  context	  where	  somebody	  needs	  those.	  We	  need	  not	  think	  of	  the	  cultural	  sphere	  generated	  by	  humanity	  as	  such	  to	  say	  that	  human	  beings	  need	  societal	  resources	  as	  much	  as	  they	  need	  natural	  resources.	  For	  much	  of	  history	  most	  communities	  would	  have	   readily	   survived	   if	  95%	  of	  all	  humans	   (those	  not	   closely	  connected	  to	  their	  cultural	  niche)	  had	  simply	  disappeared.	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Objectors	   may	   still	   insist	   that,	   after	   all,	   for	   any	   new	   generation	   societal	  resources	   are	   like	   natural	   resources	   in	   what	   matters	   most:	   they	   have	   not	   been	  
created	  by	  them.	   This	   is	   a	   central	  moral	   equivalence	   between	  natural	   and	   societal	  resources	   that	   does	   not	   vanish	   because	   of	   dissimilarities.	   	   Suppose	   Nazaire	   and	  Nicholas	  are	  born	  the	  same	  day,	  Nazaire	  in	  Haiti,	  Nicholas	  in	  the	  US.	  Both	  are	  on	  a	  par	   as	   far	   as	   natural	   resources	   are	   concerned,	   but	   also	   regarding	   the	   societal	  resources	   of	   both	   countries:	   neither	   has	   done	   anything	   to	   create	   any	   of	   those.	  	  Nazaire	  and	  Nicholas	  have	  the	  same	  claims	  to	  the	  overall	  heap	  of	  (natural	  resources	  and	  spaces	  +	  societal	  resources	  of	  US	  +	  societal	  resources	  of	  Haiti).	  	  But	  according	  to	  OGJ,	  Nicholas	  would	  be	  raised	  with	  entitlements	  to	  the	  societal	  resources	  of	  the	  US,	  and	   Nazaire	   with	   entitlements	   to	   the	   societal	   resources	   of	   Haiti.	   One	   might	  emphatically	  ask:	  how	  could	  this	  be	  just?	  	  	  7.	   Let	   us	   look	   closely	   at	   Nazaire	   and	   Nicholas.	   At	   birth	   they	   have	   certain	   claims.	  Grounded	   in	   common	   humanity	   they	   can	   make	   demands	   against	   the	   rest	   of	   the	  world,	  and	  qua	  humans	  they	  also	  become	  co-­‐owners	  of	  the	  earth.	  Since	  neither	  has	  done	  more	  or	  less	  than	  any	  other	  person	  to	  create	  the	  resources	  and	  spaces	  of	  the	  earth,	   the	   boys	   acquire	   the	   same	   claims	   to	   resources	   and	   spaces	   that	   all	   other	  humans	  have	  had,	   currently	  have,	   and	   continue	   to	  have.	   If	  per	   impossibile	  Nazaire	  and	  Nicholas	  entered	  a	  world	  without	  any	  human	  imprint,	  they	  would	  still	  have	  the	  same	   claims	   the	   day	   after	   their	   birth,	   and	   on	   all	   subsequent	   days,	   though	   only	  against	  each	  other.	   	  But	  we	  live	   in	  a	  world	  with	  human	  imprint,	  where	  the	  normal	  case	  is	  that	  babies	  receive	  attention	  from	  somebody.	  	  Crucially,	  Nazaire	  and	  Nicholas	  also	  have	  claims	  against	  their	  parents.	  	  This	  is	  where	  they	  begin	  to	  differ.	  Qua	  humans	  they	  have	  the	  same	  claims	  against	  the	  same	  people	  (everybody).	  Qua	  children	  they	  have	  claims	  against	  their	  respective	  parents.	  Nazaire	   and	  Nicholas	  have	   claims	   to	   care	   against	   the	  people	  who	  elected	   to	  bring	  them	  into	  the	  world,	  or	  anyway,	  who	  made	  choices	  that	  immediately	  caused	  them	  to	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exist.	   To	   do	   the	   best	   they	   can	   in	   this	   regard,	   Nazaire’s	   and	   Nicholas’s	   parents	  respectively	  need	  help	   from	  their	  communities.	  Generally	   for	  children	   to	  get	  on	   in	  life	  means	  for	  them	  to	  be	  raised	  to	  function	  at	  least	  reasonably	  well	  in	  their	  cultural	  niche.	   So	  Nazaire	   and	  Nicholas	   have	   claims	   against	   their	   parents	   to	   raise	   them	   in	  such	  a	  way	  that	  they	  can	  do	  okay	  in	  the	  cultural	  niche	  they	  will	  likely	  inhabit.	  17	  	  So	   from	  birth	   onwards,	  Nazaire	   and	  Nicholas	   should	   be	   treated	   as	   growing	  members	  of	  different	  communities.	  Communities	  include	  members	  of	  different	  ages.	  Some	  are	   in	   their	  prime.	  They	  maintain	   and	  decide	  on	   the	   fate	  of	   the	   community.	  Others	  are	  fading	  away	  from	  it.	  Yet	  others	  are	  growing	  into	  it.	  Humans	  naturally	  live	  in	  communities,	  and	  growing	  members	  have	  claims	  not	  only	  against	  their	  parents	  to	  receive	   care.	   They	   also	   have	   claims	   against	   their	   communities	   to	   be	   supportive	  throughout	  this	  socialization.	  Often	  young	  humans	  grow	  into	  different	  communities	  simultaneously,	  perhaps	  a	  religious	  group,	  a	  linguistic	  group	  (or	  two)	  and	  a	  political	  group.	  All	  of	  them	  have	  collective	  obligations	  to	  be	  appropriately	  supportive.	  Much	  as	  Nazaire	  and	  Nicholas	  have	  claims	  to	  parental	  care	  to	  different	  parents,	  they	  also	  have	   claims	   to	   communal	   care	   to	   different	   communities.	   Nazaire	   is	   a	   growing	  member	  of	  the	  political	  community	  of	  Haiti,	  Nicholas	  of	  the	  political	  community	  of	  the	  US.	  This	  situation	  has	  not	  arisen	  through	  choices	  they	  made.	  Nonetheless,	  there	  is	  great	  moral	  relevance	  in	  their	  relationships	  with	  parents	  and	  communities.	  	  Let	  us	  return	  to	  the	  three	  differences	  between	  societal	  and	  natural	  resources	  that	   we	   noted	   earlier.	   First	   of	   all,	   societal	   resources	   are	   somebody’s	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  17	  For	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  fact	  that,	  at	  birth,	  children	  enter	  a	  social	  world,	  see	  also	  Carens	  (2013),	  chapter	  2.	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accomplishment,	   whereas	   natural	   resources	   and	   spaces	   exist	   independently	   of	  human	   accomplishment.	   But	   since	   human	   creations	   are	   somebody’s	  accomplishment,	   different	   members	   of	   a	   new	   generation	   have	   differential	  entitlements	   to	   them	   although	   they	   do	   not	   have	   such	   entitlements	   to	   natural	  resources.	   This	   happens	   via	   differential	   claims	   against	   those	   who	   already	   have	  differential	   claims	   to	   societal	   resources.	   For	   a	   newborn	   child	   this	   is	   the	   case	   via	  claims	  against	  parents	  and	  communities.	  	  The	  second	  difference	   is	   that	  societal	  resources	  (on	  earth)	  are	  generated	   in	  particular	   contexts	   that	   often	   persist	   in	   some	   way	   and	   thus	   involve	   people	  differentially.	   This	   claim	   is	   not	   true	   of	   relics	   of	   earlier	   civilizations	   found	   in	  excavations,	  or	  of	  antics	  that	  continue	  to	  circulate	  but	  can	  no	  longer	  be	  produced,	  or	  of	  artistic	  creations	  from	  bygone	  eras.	  However,	  this	  claim	  is	  true	  of	  many	  things	  we	  use	  in	  our	  lives.	  This	  matters	  as	  we	  reflect	  on	  the	  differential	  entitlements	  of	  Nazaire	  and	  Nicholas.	  At	  birth	  those	  two	  acquire	  differential	  entitlements	  via	  claims	  against	  parents.	  Those	  do	  not	  hold	  different	   shares	  of	  manna	   from	  heaven	  but	  of	  human-­‐made	  products	  that	  require	  a	  cultural	  context	  to	  be	  made.	  Anything	  humans	  make	  requires	   some	   skill,	   some	   understanding,	   and	   often	   a	   certain	   infrastructure.	  Frequently	   it	   takes	   considerable	   skill,	   much	   understanding,	   and	   a	   sophisticated	  infrastructure.	   To	   a	   large	   extent	   it	   is	   the	   cultural	   context	   that	   encourages	   or	  discourages	   the	   development	   of	   particular	   capacities.	   This	   is	   why	   trade	   is	   often	  productive	   on	   all	   sides:	   each	   side	   gets	   to	   take	   advantage	   of	   what	   it	   can	   do	   best	  (relative	  to	  its	  abilities)	  to	  acquire	  goods	  and	  services	  others	  are	  best	  at	  providing.	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But	   cultural	   contexts	   require	   maintenance	   and	   development.	   As	   Nazaire’s	  and	   Nicholas’s	   parents	   and	   their	   communities	   fulfill	   their	   obligations	   to	   raise	  children	   to	   be	   functioning	  members	   of	   their	   community,	   they	   ipso	   facto	   socialize	  them	   into	   becoming	   capable	   of	   playing	   some	   role	   in	   maintaining	   and	   developing	  their	  cultural	  practices.	  Early	  one	  they	  will	  receive	  a	  lot	  (which	  is	  owed	  to	  them,	  as	  we	   noted).	   But	   as	   time	   passes	   they	  will	   be	   expected	   to	   take	   over	   responsibilities.	  This	  process	  unfolds	   in	  multifarious	  ways.	   In	   some	  cases	   it	   fails	   altogether.	  But	   in	  most	  cases	  these	  efforts	  meet	  with	  some	  success.	  	  Eventually	  Nazaire	  and	  Nicholas	  are	  expected	  to	  assume	  obligations	  towards	  the	  community	  that	  has	  hopefully	  discharged	  its	  obligations	  towards	  them.	  This	  also	  mean	  they	  will	  start	  participating	  in	  a	  shared	  stewardship	  of	  the	  cultural	  resources	  of	  their	  respective	  society	  and	  hold	  a	  claim	  to	  those	  resources	  that	  members	  of	  the	  community	   share	   with	   each	   other,	   but	   not	   with	   those	   who	   are	   not	   part	   of	   that	  culture.	   In	   the	   course	   of	   their	   upbringing,	   Nazaire	   and	  Nicholas	   acquire	   stakes	   in	  different	  cultural	  contexts	  that	  enable	  the	  creation	  of	  different	  human	  products.	  	  The	  third	  difference	  is	  that	  it	  makes	  sense	  to	  say	  individuals	  require	  for	  their	  survival	  and	  for	  all	  their	  activities	  the	  earth	  as	  a	  whole,	  but	  not	  that	  they	  require	  the	  sum	  total	  of	  human	  accomplishments.	  People	  require	  the	  culture-­‐specific	  resources	  provided	   by	   their	   cultural	   niche.	   In	   addition	   to	   the	   two	   points	   already	  made,	   this	  means	   Nazaire	   and	   Nicholas	   acquire	   a	   formative	   relationship	   with	   their	   cultural	  niche:	  that	  niche	  gradually	  make	  them	  into	  the	  people	  they	  ultimately	  become.	  But	  neither	  stands	  in	  that	  relationship	  with	  the	  cultural	  context	  of	  the	  other.	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Before	   this	   background,	   and	   given	   the	   features	   that	   are	   constitutive	   of	   a	  political	   community	   generally	   (a	   kind	   of	   cooperativeness	   and	   coerciveness),	  eventually	   Nazaire	   and	   Nicholas	  may	   raise	   complaints	   against	   their	   environment.	  They	  can	  protest	  if	  their	  environment	  favors	  some	  who	  have	  been	  raised	  in	  it	  much	  more	   than	   it	   favors	   others.	   For	   instance,	   they	   can	   complain	   about	   inequality	   of	  opportunity	   in	   education,	   or	   against	   excessive	   inequalities	   in	   the	   distribution	   of	  goods.	   	  But	   these	  are	  complaints	  against	   their	  respective	  communities,	  not	  against	  the	  community	  of	  the	  other.	  	  	   So	  appearances	  notwithstanding,	  at	  birth	  Nazaire	  and	  Nicholas	  acquire	  very	  different	  claims.	  That	  is	  because	  they	  acquire	  claims	  against	  their	  parents,	  who	  are	  generally	  situated	  very	  differently.	  Our	  discussion	  has	  also	  shown	  that	  natural	  and	  societal	  resources	  are	  very	  different	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  entitlements	  children	  acquire	  at	   birth.	  Any	   two	   children	  do	  not	   differ	   at	   birth	  when	   it	   comes	   to	   entitlements	   to	  natural	  resources.	  But	  they	  do	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  entitlements	  to	  societal	  resources.	  I	  have	   selected	   my	   two	   characters	   from	   Haiti	   and	   the	   US	   to	   make	   this	   reasoning	  maximally	   problematic.	   The	   US	   is	   one	   of	   the	   richest	   places	   on	   earth.	   Haiti	   is	   the	  poorest	   country	   in	   the	   Western	   hemisphere.	   So	   does	   my	   argument	   not	   merely	  glorify	  the	  status	  quo?	  	  	   Of	   course,	   the	   status	   quo	  must	   change	   substantially.	   Both	  Haiti	   and	   the	  US	  must	   reform	   internally	   quite	   a	   bit	   to	   be	   just	   societies.	   In	   addition,	   there	   are	  obligations	   deriving	   from	   other	   grounds	   of	   justice,	   including	   common	   humanity,	  collective	   ownership	   of	   the	   earth,	   shared	   subjection	   to	   the	   trading	   regime	   and	  membership	   in	   the	   global	   order.	   A	   reform	   of	   the	   world’s	   political	   and	   economic	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system	  should	  proceed	  along	  those	  lines.	  Once	  all	  that	  has	  been	  done,	  there	  will	  no	  longer	  be	  anything	  problematic	  about	  acquiring	  differential	  entitlements	  at	  birth.	  In	  our	  world,	  being	  born	  in	  locations	  as	  dramatically	  different	  in	  terms	  of	  average	  life	  prospects	  as	   the	  US	  and	  Haiti	  means	  being	  born	   in	   locations	   that	  vary	   in	   terms	  of	  how	  much	  average	  people	  suffer	  from	  the	  world’s	  injustices.	  But	  a	  proper	  response	  to	  that	  is	  not	  to	  argue	  that	  at	  birth	  any	  two	  children	  acquire	  the	  same	  entitlement	  to	  all	  societal	  resources	  on	  earth.	  A	  proper	  response	  is	  to	  make	  the	  world	  more	  just,	  for	  which	  OGJ	  makes	  a	  suggestion	  that	  I	  just	  sketched	  very	  roughly.	  	  	  8.	   So	   societal	   resources	   differ	   from	   natural	   resources	   in	  morally	   significant	  ways.	  Since	   we	   have	   seen	   that	   two	   humans	   readily	   have	   differential	   claims	   to	   societal	  resources,	  those	  can	  be	  excluded	  from	  the	  collectively	  owned	  pool.18	  However,	  there	  is	  another	   line	  of	  objection	   to	  which	  we	  must	   turn.	  That	   line	  agrees	   that	   it	   is	  only	  natural	  resources	  and	  spaces	  with	  regard	  to	  which	  we	  should	  determine	  fairness	  in	  the	  distribution	  of	  people	  across	  the	  earth.	  But	  instead	  of	  proportionality	  a	  different	  manner	   of	   assessing	   that	   distribution	   should	   be	   used,	   one	   that	   focuses	   on	   the	  multifarious	  ways	  in	  which	  spaces	  and	  resources	  are	  integrated	  into	  cultures.	  	  Kolers	   (2009)	   uses	   the	   term	   “ethnogeographic	   community”	   to	   emphasize	  that,	   over	   time,	   communities	   adopt	   certain	   land-­‐use	   patterns	   through	  which	   they	  control	   and	   shape	   space,	   which	   in	   turn	   affects	   their	   cultural	   patterns.	   Their	  conception,	  or	  “ontology,”	  of	  land	  materializes	  through	  acts	  of	  bounding,	  controlling	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  A	  related	  question	  is	  under	  what	  conditions	  refinements	  applied	  to	  natural	  resources	  also	  become	  part	  of	  the	  common	  pool.	  OGJ,	  chapter	  7,	  discusses	  that	  matter.	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and	   shaping	   space.	   So	   an	   ethnogeographic	   community	   is	   a	   group	   of	   people	   who	  share	  densely	  and	  pervasively	  interacting	  land-­‐use	  patterns	  as	  well	  as	  an	  ontology	  of	   land.	   One	   example	   of	   a	   non-­‐mainstream	   ethnogeographic	   community	   is	   the	  Bedouins.	  What	   is	  distinctive	  about	  them	  is	  not	  religion,	  ethnicity	  or	   language,	  but	  the	  way	  they	  interact	  with	  the	  land.	  	  An	  ethnogeographic	  community	  can	  lay	  claim	  to	  a	  region	  to	  the	  exclusion	  of	  others	   if	   it	   has	   demonstrably	   achieved	   plenitude	   in	   that	   region	   and	   if	   there	   is	   no	  competing	   right	   of	   that	   sort	   to	   the	   territory.	   Plenitude	   may	   be	   empirical	   or	  intentional.	   Empirical	   plenitude	   captures	   the	   internal	   diversity	   and	   complexity	   of	  regional	   land-­‐use	   patterns,	   and	   how	   they	   differ	   from	   such	   patterns	   elsewhere.	  Intentional	   plenitude	   captures	   the	   projects	   that	   agents	   have	   with	   regard	   to	  enhancing	   or	  maintaining	   empirical	   plenitude	   in	   a	   region.	   A	   community	   achieves	  plenitude	  if	  by	  their	  standards	  their	  land-­‐use	  patterns	  push	  the	  use	  of	  the	  land	  to	  its	  limits.	  Ethnogeographic	  communities	  can	   legitimize	  claims	   “by	  demonstrating	   that	  the	   fullness	   of	   the	   territory	   has	   been	   formative	   in	   their	   own	   identity,	   and	   their	  projects	  have	  been	  formative	  of	  the	  place	  itself”	  (p	  137).	  	  Kolers	  is	  not	  concerned	  with	  immigration	  directly.	  Still,	  his	  view	  generates	  a	  global	   standpoint	   to	   think	   about	   immigration.	   That	   standpoint	   prescribes	   whose	  ontology	  of	  land	  matters	  in	  a	  region,	  and	  thereby	  also	  tells	  us	  when	  the	  distribution	  of	   people	   across	   is	   fair.	   If	   a	   community	   achieves	   plenitude	   by	   its	   standards,	   then	  presumably	  it	  does	  not	  have	  to	  permit	  immigration.	  Kolers	  explores	  how	  to	  assess	  competing	  claims	  to	  a	  region.	  Crucially,	  this	  way	  of	  approaching	  immigration	  differs	  from	  what	  is	  presupposed	  in	  the	  kind	  of	  proportionality	  my	  account	  makes	  central.	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Kolers	  denies	  that	  we	  need	  a	  universal	  criterion	  of	  use.	  We	  need	  a	  universally	   fair	  way	  of	  testing	  criteria	  of	  use.	  The	  idea	  of	  plenitude	  is	  meant	  to	  do	  this	  work.	  	  Kolers’s	  account	  is	  very	  sensible	  in	  many	  ways.	  He	  demonstrates	  how	  natural	  it	   is	   to	   make	   room	   for	   attachment	   to	   one’s	   native	   region	   also	   in	   an	   account	   of	  immigration.	  People	  are	  not	  merely	  deeply	  attached	  to	  the	  land	  on	  which	  they	  make	  their	   lives,	  but	  people	  and	  regions	  stand	  in	   interactive	  relationships.	  To	  the	  extent	  that	  communities	  have	  a	  mentality,	  it	  has	  been	  shaped	  by	  what	  their	  region	  permits	  or	   forces	   them	   to	   do	   to	   get	   on.	   It	   matters	   whether	   people	   live	   in	   mountainous	  regions,	  by	  the	  sea,	  or	  in	  the	  desert,	  and	  it	  matters	  whether	  the	  climate	  is	  harsh	  or	  moderate.	  It	  matters	  whether	  people	  reside	  in	  wide-­‐open	  spaces	  or	  in	  tough	  terrain	  that	  limits	  unimpeded	  movement	  to	  confined	  areas.	  It	  also	  matters	  if	   life	  is	  shaped	  by	  an	  ongoing	  struggle	  to	  bring	  water	  to	  the	  house,	  by	  efforts	  to	  shelter	  from	  storms,	  by	  challenges	  of	  fending	  off	  water-­‐related	  diseases,	  the	  hardship	  caused	  by	  infertile	  soils	  or	  by	  the	  fortunate	  absence	  of	  all	  of	  these.	  Just	  how	  all	  this	  matters	  depends	  on	  many	   factors	   –	  Montesquieu	   and	  Rousseau	   famously	   thought	   one	  way	   in	  which	   it	  matters	  is	  appropriateness	  of	  forms	  of	  government	  -­‐-­‐	  but	  all	  this	  is	  too	  large	  a	  topic	  for	  us	   to	  explore.	  But	   through	  such	  challenges,	  people	  also	  shape	   the	   land	   in	   their	  own	  image,	  and	  over	  generations	  develop	  an	  intense	  interactive	  relationship	  with	  it.	  	  Location	  matters	   in	  many	  ways	   as	  well.	   Certain	   regions	   have	   been	   staging	  areas	   for	  armies	  over	  millennia	  because	  geographical	   factors	   limit	  where	  an	  army	  can	  pass.	  Some	  regions	  have	  been	  able	  to	  produce	  goods	  that	  proved	  so	  irresistible	  that	   others	   would	   make	   hazardous	   journeys	   to	   acquire	   them,	   and	   project	   force	  around	   the	  world	   to	   conquer	   territories	   where	   they	   are	   produced.	   Other	   regions	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have	  proved	  inhospitable	  to	  foreigners,	  strategically	  remote,	  or	  without	  potential	  to	  produce	   goods	   that	   others	   desire.	   These	   factors	   too	   matter	   deeply	   for	   shaping	   a	  people’s	  trajectory,	  and	  in	  turn	  create	  highly	  differential	  opportunities	  or	  necessities	  for	  them	  to	  interact	  with	  their	  natural	  environment.	  Unsurprisingly,	   attachments	   to	   land	   run	   deep.	   Much	   poetry	   and	   countless	  novels	  make	  the	  land	  central.	  Much	  art	  celebrates	  it.	  Even	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  people	  voluntarily	   leave	   the	   land	   to	   which	   they	   have	   grown	   accustomed	   to	   seek	   better	  prospects,	  they	  normally	  do	  so	  with	  a	  heavy	  heart	  (unless	  perhaps	  they	  have	  been	  pervasively	   treated	   there	   as	   inferiors	   so	   that	   their	   subordination	   has	   become	  associated	  with	  the	   land).	   	   If	  people	  are	   forced	  off	   land	  that	  has	  been	  formative	  to	  their	  character,	  this	  frequently	  is	  a	  reason	  for	  ongoing	  hostility	  or	  at	  least	  mournful	  reminiscence.	  History	  is	  replete	  with	  episodes	  of	  violent	  displacements,	  not	  least	  of	  all	  the	  20th	  century.	  Many	  readers	  will	  have	  encountered	  individual	  fates	  produced	  by	   these	   upheavals,	   personally	   or	   through	   testimony	  or	   in	   reality-­‐inspired	   fiction.	  Separation	  from	  the	  native	  land	  always	  features	  prominently	  in	  such	  accounts.	  	  	  In	  many	  ways,	  Kolers’	  account	  and	  mine	  are	  complementary.	  My	  account	  has	  nothing	  to	  say	  about	  why	  people	  would	  have	  entitlements	  to	  living	  here	  rather	  than	  
there.	   It	   does	   not	   characterize	   the	  ways	   in	  which	   people	   are	   being	   shaped	   by	   the	  region	  they	  occupy	  and	  vice	  versa,	  or	  explore	  the	  importance	  of	  that	  process.	  But	  my	  account	   also	   offers	   no	   resistance	   to	   such	   accounts.	   There	   is	   nothing	   problematic	  from	   the	   standpoint	  of	   justice	   for	  people	   to	   settle	  down	   somewhere	  and	  preclude	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others	   from	   taking	   up	   the	   same	   territory.	   Nonetheless,	   such	   takings	   occur	   on	   a	  shared	  planet.	  It	  is	  that	  thought	  that	  my	  theory	  articulates.19	  A	  major	  target	  for	  Kolers	  is	  the	  “Anglo-­‐American	  ethnogeography”	  he	  claims	  has	   been	   adopted	   by	   most	   mainstream	   Anglo-­‐American	   philosopher	   in	   recent	  centuries.	  This	  ethnogeography	  	  treats	   land	  as	   the	  passive	  object	  of	  human	  activity	  and	   ignores	  all	   forms	  of	  value	  that	  are	  not	  easily	  priced	  on	  the	  market.	  These	  assumptions	  ignore	  the	  dynamic,	  bi-­‐directional	  relationship	  between	  people	  and	  land	  –	  the	  mutually	  formative	  interactions	  between	  people	  and	  their	  habitat	  –	  and	  therefore	  hide	  the	  fact	  that	  it	  is	  impossible	  fairly	  to	  compare	  the	  holdings	  of	  persons	  across	  economies	  or	  ethnogeographies.	  (p	  64)	  	  	  My	  account	  differs	   from	  this	  characterization	  and	  does	  not	  advocate	   for	  an	  Anglo-­‐American	  ethnogeography.	  My	  guiding	  idea	   is	  that	  we	  need	  to	  assess	  the	  value	  for	  human	  purposes	  of	  three-­‐dimensional	  parts	  of	  the	  world.	  That	  can	  sensibly	  be	  done	  only	  if	  we	  do	  not	  ignore	  forms	  of	  value	  that	  are	  not	  commonly	  priced	  on	  markets.	  	  	   At	   the	   same	   time,	   my	   account	   proposes	   non-­‐standard	   evaluations	   that	  
expand	  market	  perspectives	  bringing	  more	  aspects	  of	  our	  natural	  world	  under	  the	  purview	   of	   market-­‐based	   pricing.	   However,	   the	  motivation	   for	   doing	   so	   is	   (only)	  that	   we	   share	   a	   planet	   and	   therefore	   require	   some	   way	   of	   making	   sense	   of	  competing	  claims	  to	  space	  and	  resources.	  Among	  other	  things,	  and	  pace	  Kolers,	  we	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  19	  Kolers	  and	  I	  diverge	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  the	  claims	  of	  people	  on	  land	  lost	  to	  climate	  change.	  Risse	  (2009)	  argues	  that	  people	  on	  disappearing	  island	  nations	  have	  a	  right	  to	  relocation.	  	  As	  individuals	  they	  have	  such	  a	  claim	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  justice.	  	  But	  my	  account	  does	  not	  deliver	  a	  collective	  right	  of	  a	  whole	  people	  to	  relocate	  to	  the	  same	  place.	  This	  will	  be	  possible	  only	  if	  considers	  of	  proportionate	  use	  permit	  it.	  The	  rest	  of	  the	  world	  owes	  these	  people	  a	  new	  home,	  as	  well	  as	  efforts	  to	  try	  to	  make	  it	  possible	  that	  the	  disruption	  of	  their	  lives	  does	  not	  become	  even	  worse	  through	  relocation	  to	  an	  area	  that	  does	  not	  support	  their	  life	  patterns	  or	  by	  breaking	  them	  apart.	  But	  this	  will	  not	  in	  general	  mean	  that	  they	  can	  all	  relocate	  together.	  Kolers	  (2012)	  argues	  (against	  both	  Risse	  (2009)	  and	  Meisels	  (2009))	  that	  this	  kind	  of	  approach,	  in	  virtue	  of	  its	  individualistic	  outlook,	  mischaracterizes	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  wrong	  inflicted	  on	  those	  who	  lose	  their	  lands.	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need	  comparability	  across	  groups	  to	  regulate	   immigration.	  However,	  my	  proposed	  measure	  of	  proportionate	  use	  is	  pragmatic.	  My	  argument	  against	  the	  Equal	  Division	  conception	  of	  collective	  ownership	   in	  chapter	  6	  of	  OGJ	   is	   that	   its	  defenders	  need	  a	  measure	  for	  comparing	  bundles	  of	  resources	  and	  spaces	  of	  the	  earth	  that	  is	  beyond	  reasonable	  contestation,	  but	  that	  such	  a	  measure	  is	  unavailable	  for	  substantive	  (not	  merely	  epistemic)	   reasons.	  So	   I	  use	   this	  kind	  of	  measure	  only	  as	  a	   rough	  guide	   to	  obtain	  an	  assessment	  of	  when	  would-­‐be	  immigrants	  can	  be	  fairly	  rejected.	  	  	   Still,	  we	  need	  such	  a	  measure	  to	  assess	  when	  claims	  to	  spaces	  and	  resources	  unacceptably	   infringe	   upon	   claims	   of	   others.	   Kolers	   allows	   for	   some	   to	   occupy	  rather	  disproportionately	  large	  regions	  if	  this	  fits	  their	  ontology.	  Or,	  to	  articulate	  the	  concern	  without	   talking	  about	  a	  notion	  of	  proportionality	  alien	   to	  Kolers’	  account,	  he	  allows	  groups	  to	   take	  up	  space	  regardless	  of	  how	  their	  claims	  bear	  on	  those	  of	  others.	  To	  be	  sure,	  he	  does	  address	  the	  case	  where	  different	  ethnogeographies	  make	  claims	  to	  the	  same	  territory,	  offering	  helpful	  advice.	  But	  it	  would	  be	  hard	  to	  see	  how,	  on	  his	   account,	   a	   group	  of	  people	  who	   live	   elsewhere	   could	  have	   a	   claim	   to	   entry	  simply	  because	  of	  their	  currently	  highly	  crowded	  situation.	  20	  	   Also	  notice	   that	   these	  ontologies	  of	   land	  have	  often	  been	  acquired	  at	   times	  when	  many	   fewer	  humans	  existed	  and	   thus	  when	  demands	  on	   shared	   spaces	  and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  20	  [This	  footnote	  is	  still	  under	  discussion	  with	  Avery	  Kolers.]	  We	  need	  to	  be	  careful	  here.	  Kolers	  does	  have	  an	  account	  of	  how	  a	  group	  of	  people	  who	  live	  in	  place	  A	  could	  have	  a	  claim	  to	  territory	  in	  B	  (Kolers	  (2012)).	  If	  	  (1)	  A	  is	  empirically	  full	  by	  their	  (people	  of	  A’s)	  lights;	  (2)	  B	  is	  not	  empirically	  full	  by	  their	  (people	  of	  B’s)	  lights;	  and	  (3)	  they	  (people	  in	  A)	  achieve	  intentional	  plenitude	  (i.e.	  they	  have	  concrete	  plans	  for	  achieving	  and	  maintaining	  empirical	  plenitude)	  in	  B	  without	  emptying	  it	  of	  people	  or	  things	  that	  -­‐-­‐	  by	  their	  own	  (B’s)	  lights	  -­‐-­‐	  are	  already	  there;	  then	  (4)	  people	  in	  A	  have	  a	  prima	  facie	  territorial	  claim	  to	  B.	  This	  account	  allows	  territorial	  expansion,	  but	  also	  restricts	  it.	  But	  to	  my	  mind	  the	  critical	  case	  would	  be	  if	  (2)	  is	  not	  satisfied.	  That	  is	  where	  the	  problem	  reenters	  that	  some	  groups	  could	  occupy	  an	  inordinate	  share	  of	  resources	  and	  spaces	  regardless	  of	  overcrowding	  elsewhere.	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resources	  were	  more	  limited.	  “In	  the	  nineteenth	  and	  twentieth	  century,”	  writes	  H.G.	  Wells	  at	  the	  very	  beginning	  of	  his	  The	  Shape	  of	  Things	  to	  Come,	  	  	   the	   story	   of	   mankind	   upon	   this	   planet	   undergoes	   a	   change	   of	   phase.	   It	  	   broadens	   out.	   It	   unifies.	   It	   ceases	   to	   be	   a	   tangle	   of	   more	   and	   more	  	   interrelated	   histories	   and	   it	   becomes	   plainly	   and	   consciously	   one	   history.	  	   There	   is	   a	   complete	   confluence	   of	   racial,	   social	   and	   political	   destinies.	  	   ((1933),	  p	  17)	  	  	  Wells	  is	  right,	  and	  for	  this	  reason	  ontologies	  acquired	  antecedently	  are	  of	  restricted	  reach	  in	  our	  era	  of	  high-­‐density	  populations,	  a	  tendency	  exacerbated	  by	  the	  threat	  posed	  by	  climate	  change	  to	  human	  living	  spaces.	  To	  be	  sure,	  my	  account	  is	  much	  less	  hospitable	   than	   Kolers’s	   to	   claims	   specifically	   of	   indigenous	   populations	   whose	  ontology	  of	  land	  differs	  from	  the	  Anglo-­‐American	  ethnogeography	  (which,	  again,	  is	  in	   turn	   rather	   different	   from	   my	   proposal).	   But	   these	   normally	   are	   among	   the	  ontologies	   that	   have	   developed	   at	   times	   when	   many	   fewer	   people	   had	   claims	   to	  spaces	  and	  resources.	  	  The	  claims	  of	  such	  ethnogeographies	  must	  be	  integrated	  somehow.	  Given	  the	  importance	   of	   having	   a	   universal	   criterion	   I	   propose	   to	   think	   of	   cultural	   patterns	  that	   cannot	   be	   captured	   by	   a	   pragmatic	   measure	   generating	   cross-­‐cultural	  comparability	  as	  non-­‐standard	  scenarios	  that	  must	  be	  accommodated.	   I	  propose	  to	  treat	  such	  patterns	  in	  a	  manner	  parallel	  to	  how	  liberal	  states	  should	  accommodate	  certain	   minority	   rights.	   Where	   Kolers	   stresses	   local	   interconnectedness	   between	  land	   and	   people,	   I	   emphasize	   that	   we	   share	   a	   planet	   and	   need	   a	   criterion	   for	   a	  sensible	  division	  of	  space	   in	  some	  ways.	  For	   the	  problems	  we	  face	   in	   this	  century,	  this	  is	  a	  key	  perspective.	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   One	  may	  object	  that	   it	  misguided	  to	  single	  out	   indigenous	  ontologies	  as	  the	  ones	   that	   likely	   have	   to	   shift	   due	   to	   high	   populations.	   The	   earth	   may	   be	  overpopulated,	   the	   objector	   may	   say,	   but	   not	   because	   it	   is	   overcrowded.	   It	   is	  overpopulated	   because	   of	   excess	   consumption.	   Overpopulation	   is	   generated	   by	  multiplying	   population	   with	   consumption.	   It	   is	   the	   industrialized	   countries	   that	  overconsume.	  Therefore	  we	  should	  single	  out	  the	  Anglo-­‐American	  ethnogeography	  as	  one	  that	  was	  developed	  when	  there	  were	  many	  fewer	  people	  and	  that	  now	  has	  to	  change	  to	  accommodate	  the	  fact	  of	  high	  population.	  	  	   But	   these	   perspectives	   do	   not	   contradict	   each	   other.	   Just	   about	   all	  ethnogeographies	  must	  be	  reconsidered	  in	  the	  present	  era,	  some	  because	  they	  make	  claims	  to	  inordinate	  amounts	  of	  space	  and	  resources,	  and	  some,	  including	  the	  Anglo-­‐American	   ethnogeography,	   because	   they	   take	   a	   misguided	   attitude	   towards	  environmental	  protection.	  Both	  points	   can	  be	   recognizes	   from	  what	   I	   just	   called	  a	  key	  perspective	  for	  the	  problems	  of	  this	  century.	  	  	  9.	   I	   have	   argued	   for,	   and	   elaborated	   on,	   the	   significance	   of	   humanity’s	   collective	  ownership	  of	  the	  earth	  for	  immigration.	  My	  three	  major	  points	  are	  as	  follows:	  	  	  1.	  Contrary	  to	  philosophers	  who	  believe	  they	  can	  supplement	  an	  account	  of	  the	   normative	   peculiarity	   of	   the	   state	  with	   an	   account	   of	   immigration	   that	  does	  not	  take	  a	  global	  standpoint,	  I	  argue	  that	  we	  need	  such	  a	  standpoint	  to	  articulate	  an	  idea	  of	  proportionate	  use	  of	  the	  earth.	  	  2.	  Contrary	  to	  those	  who	  agree	  that	  proportionate	  use	  of	  the	  earth	  matters	  to	  immigration	   but	   insist	   that	   the	   common	   pool	   includes	   societal	   resources,	   I	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argue	   that	   that	   pool	   should	   exclude	   societal	   resources.	   Societal	   resources	  differ	  importantly	  from	  natural	  ones.	  	  3.	   Contrary	   to	   Kolers	   (2009),	   who	   thinks	   the	   fair	   distribution	   of	   people	  should	   be	   articulated	   in	   ways	   different	   from	   proportionate	   occupation,	   I	  argue	  that	  his	  account	  of	  ethnogeographic	  communities	  does	  not	  undermine	  the	  significance	  of	  humanity’s	  collective	  ownership	  for	  immigration.	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